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I. INTRODUCTION
Several years ago, at the ancient trade center Marrakesh, ministers
from over one hundred countries signed a trade agreement creating the
World Trade Organization ('WTO").1 The Agreement was forged at a time
of unprecedented, robust and sustained growth in world trade.2 The legion
of Uruguay Round negotiators stoked this heated trade activity by dramati-
cally liberalizing trade rules in several respects. First, the WTO Agreement
they negotiated provides for a phase-out or phase-down of import duties
throughout the world on a vast array of commodities, reducing tariffs in de-
l The trade ministers signed the Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round
of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, [hereinafter Final Act], and The Agree-
ment Creating the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY
ROUND: THE LEGAL TEXTS (1994) [hereinafter THE LEGAL TEXTS], 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1141
(1994) [hereinafter WTO Agreement]. The WTO Agreement contains four annexes, all
dated Apr. 15, 1994: the Multilateral Agreements on Trade in Goods, Annex IA, THE
LEGAL TEXTS at 20, 33 I.L.M. 1154 (1994) [hereinafter Agreements on Trade in Goods] (in-
cluding the Antidumping Agreement, infra note 17), the General Agreement on Trade in
Services, Annex IB, THE LEGAL TEXTS at 325 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 1168 (1994) [hereinafter
Agreement on Trade in Services], the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights, Annex 1C, THE LEGAL TEXTS at 365,33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994), as well as the
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Annex 2,
THE LEGAL TEXTS at 404, 33 I.L.M. 1226 (1994) [hereinafter Dispute Settlement Under-
standing], the Trade Policy Review Mechanism, Annex 3, THE LEGAL TEXrs at 434 (1994),
and the Plurilateral Trade Agreements, Annex 4, THE LEGAL TEXTS at 438. All but Annex 4
are binding on all WTO Members. WTO Agreement, art. 11.2. The Agreement went into
force on January 1, 1995. Final Act, para. 3. See The WTO: A New Organization for a New
Era, GATTIWTO NEws, Dec. 21, 1994, for a general overview of the World Trade Organi-
zation. The Final Act and WTO Agreement were the result of painstaking negotiations
which began in 1986 in Punta del Este, Uruguay. The extraordinary length of the negotia-
tions was primarily due to fundamental disagreement among certain Member countries re-
garding agricultural trade reform. For an overview of the progression of the Uruguay Round
negotiations from the U.S. perspective, see S. REP. No. 103-412, at 1-6 (1994).2The global growth rate in the mid-1990s was nearly double the rate in the 1970s and
1980s. World Trade in 1995 - Overview, WTO ANN. REP. 1995, at 9. World trade in goods
increased every year between 1984 and 1995, and experienced a pronounced volume in-
crease of almost 10% in both 1994 and 1995. See WTO ANN. REP. 1996, at 10. In value
terms it increased even more - by nearly 20%. Between 1973 and 1995, trade in goods in-
creased over eight fold, from $575 billion to almost $5 trillion. Id. at 5. One major factor
behind this trend is the dramatic increase in imports and exports by developing (non-OECD)
countries. WTO, World Trade Expanded Strongly in 1995for the Second Consecutive Year,
Press Release 11, Mar. 22, 1996, at 1. Central and Eastern European countries experienced
the most dramatic increases, of over 25%. Id. Asian countries also became increasingly im-
portant drivers for world trade, as import growth in Asia exceeded export growth for the
fourth consecutive year in 1995. Id.; see also Global Growth Reaches A New, Higher Level
That Could Be Lasting, WALL ST. J., Mar. 13, 1997, at Al (attributing global growth trend of
"unprecedented size and scope" to "vast expansion of economic freedom and property rights,
coupled with reductions in scope of government and an explosion in trade and private in-
vestment," as well as by "quickening innovation").
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veloped countries by an average of roughly forty percent.3  Second, the
WTO Agreement provides new disciplines to enhance cross border trade in
huge sectors such as agriculture, investment and services.4 Third, it creates
the binding WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding to better enforce new
and preexisting trade liberalization rules.5
These measures undoubtedly will enhance the momentum of global
trade - which reached $6 trillion in 1996 - by an estimated $755 billion
annually by the year 2002.6 For example, since the execution of the WTO
Agreement in 1994, U.S. exports increased by nearly thirty percent for
goods on which tariffs were eliminated under the WTO Agreement.7
To heighten the momentum further, at the first Ministerial Conference
of the WTO, held two years after the WTO Agreement's starting date,8 the
Members executed a supplemental Information Technology Agreement
which reduced or eliminated the remaining tariffs on a wide variety of elec-
trical equipment and electronics.9 Two months later, WTO Members
reached another supplemental agreement, this time to liberalize trade in
telecommunications, and within the year, the Members reached yet another
agreement, on expanding trade in financial services. 10
3Tariff reduction commitments under the WTO are contained in schedules annexed to
the Marrakesh Protocol to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Apr. 15, 1994,
Agreements on Trade in Goods, supra note 1, THE LEGAL TEXTS at 37, 33 I.L.M. 1165
(1994) [hereinafter GATT 1994]. For example, Schedule XX of the Protocol contains the
U.S. duty reduction commitments. These reductions were dramatic. For instance, duties on
most chemical products were reduced from levels as high as 30-40% to roughly 5% or were
completely phased out. Id.
4The agreements concerning these sectors are in Annex 1 of the WTO Agreement, supra
note 1. Further, the WTO Agreement outlaws protective "grey" measures commonly used
by countries to limit exports such as export or import restraint agreements. See, e.g., infra
notes 72-83 and accompanying text for a discussion of the effect of the Antidumping
Agreement on grey-area measures.
5See infra notes 131-34.6See supra note 2.7Bruce Stokes, Up and Crawling, NAT'L J., Mar. 30, 1996, at 709.
8The Ministerial Conference constitutes the highest level of the WTO, and is comprised
of the trade ministers from each of the WTO Members. Conference meetings are held once
every two years. INTERNATIONAL TRADE CENTRE UNCTAD/WTO & COMMONWEALTH
SECRETARIAT, BuSiNEsS GUIDE TO THE URUGUAY ROUND 34 (1995) [hereinafter BuSINESS
GUIDE TO THE URUGUAY ROUND]. The first meeting was held in Singapore in December
1996, two years after the commencement of the WTO. See WTO Agreement, supra note 1.
9WTO Ministerial Declaration on Trade in Information Technology Products, December
13, 1996, executed on March 26, 1997. See ITA DONE DEAL'!, OFF. OF U.S. TRADE
REPRESENTATIVE, Press Release 97-25, Mar. 26, 1997; Information Technology Agreement
on Track Toward March 26 Conclusion, OFF. OF U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, Press Re-
lease 97-21, Mar. 13, 1997; INFO. & MEDIA REL. DIv., WTO, Elimination of Tariffs on
Computer Products by Year 2000 Agreed, Focus, Mar. 1997, at 1.
10See WTO, Ruggerio Congratulates Governments on Landmark Telecommunications
Agreement, Press Release 67, Feb. 17, 1997; WTO, Successful Conclusion of the WTO's Fi-
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These sweeping reforms present tremendous opportunities for global
exporters to expand their overseas markets, and for domestic industries and
consumers to enhance their access to competitive overseas suppliers of ma-
terials and finished products. There is, however, one significant threat to
the sanguine prospects for freer international trade - antidumping action.
While the WTO Agreement limits the mechanisms that Member countries
may employ to restrict imports, it allows antidumping action as one of the
few remaining protections against imports. The WTO Agreement contains
a revised Antidumping Agreement setting forth the rules under which each
Member country may impose antidumping duties on imports of targeted
merchandise traded at "unfair" prices.11
At a time when global export volume is burgeoning, customs duties are
phased out and other import barriers are eliminated, industries throughout
the world find themselves exposed to international competition as they have
never been before. Predictably, many will seek import protection. The
Antidumping Agreement is now the most viable basis for imposing or pre-serving protective duties. A Trade Ministry official from China, the most
frequent target of global dumping actions, perceived this trend, remarking:
"In a world where tariff and non-tariff barriers decrease rapidly, anti-
dumping measures are becoming increasingly important in protecting do-
mestic manufacturers. 12
This article will first examine why the antidumping law will become
the weapon of choice for import protection in the new millennium. It then
will provide an overview of the antidumping regulatory regime, and the
controversy it has engendered. Finally this article will discuss the compli-
ance measures that global exporters should consider in order to avoid anti-
dumping liability in the future.
II. ANTIDUMPING MEASURES: THE WEAPON OF CHOICE FOR
PROTECTION
A. Background
The antidumping concept has been in circulation since the late 18th
century.13 International use of antidumping rules was formalized at Bretton
nancial Services Negotiations, Press Release 86, Dec. 15, 1997 (financial services include
banking, insurance, securities and financial information).
" See infra notes 136-50 and accompanying text.
12Tony Walker, Beiing in Tough Line on Dumping, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 4, 1997, at 4
(quoting Zhang Yugling, Deputy Director General, China Ministry of Trade).
13 See JACOB VINER, DUMPING: A PROBLEM IN INTERNATiONAL TRADE, 35-68 (1966)
(providing a history of the origin of the dumping concept, dating back to Alexander Hamil-
ton's 1791 "Report on Manufactures," as well as the emergence of domestic and interna-
tional legislation to counteract dumping practices, largely in the United States and European
countries).
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Woods, in 1947, where the contracting parties drafted Article VI of the
original GATT to deal with the antidumping "problem.' 4 In order to dis-
cipline the growing and disparate application of antidumping duties within
a framework of substantive and procedural rules, the GATT parties formu-
lated a detailed "Antidumping Code" at the Kennedy Round of multilateral
negotiations in 1967,' 5 and again in amended, more detailed form at the
Tokyo Round negotiations concluded in 1979.16 The WTO Antidumping
Agreement in turn replaced the 1979 GATT Code and, as discussed in this
article, sets forth the current international precepts which WTO Members
must implement and abide by.
17
Antidumping complaints have emerged as a profoundly effective
weapon. Often, the mere filing of an antidumping complaint has a marked
chilling effect on competition, both on price levels and import volume. The
complex and discretionary antidumping rules, and the burdens an anti-
dumping investigation imposes, often place exporters and importers at a se-
vere disadvantage.
The results of antidumping investigations speak for themselves. In the
United States, for instance, the Department of Commerce, which is respon-
sible for investigating whether exporters are dumping in the United States,
has a dumping "conviction rate" of over ninety-six percent.' 8 It is no won-
der then that exporters and importers facing even a rumor that they will be
brought before such a "hanging judge" often become reluctant to pursue
opportunities in the U.S. market.' 9 The startling success of antidumping
complaints has a predictable effect. Continuing with the example of the
14General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, article VI, T.I.A.S. No. 1700,
55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT].
1
5 Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, 1968, GATT B.I.S.D. (15th Supp.) at 32, 651 U.N.T.S. 320 (1968).
16Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, 1979, GATT B.I.S.D. (26th Supp.) at 171, 31 U.S.T. 4919 (1979).
17See Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, Agreement on Trade in Goods, supra note 1, THE LEGAL TEXTS at
168 [hereinafter Antidumping Agreement]. GATT 1994, supra note 3, incorporates by ref-
erence the antidumping provisions of Article VI of the GATT, supra note 14. See GATT
1994, supra note 3 (incorporating the provisions of the original GATT, as amended by the
Final Act).
18See Import Trade Administration website at <http://www.ita.doc.gov/import adminl
records/stats>, showing that only 3.9% of active cases from January 1, 1980 to July 31, 1997
resulted in a "negative" dumping determination (i.e. a finding that exporters were not
dumping); see also CONG. BUDGEr OFF. REP., How THE GATT AFFECTS U.S. ANTIDUMPING
AND COUNTERVAILING DUTY POLICY 50 (Sept. 1994). The International Trade Commission
("ITC"), the U.S. entity responsible for assessing whether a domestic industry is materially
injured by dumped imports (the other phase of an antidumping investigation), makes af-
firmative findings in over 60% of the cases brought before it, a less certain but still troubling
scenario for exporters and importers faced with an antidumping action. Id.
19See infra notes 276-80 and accompanying text for further criticism of current enforce-
ment of antidumping laws.
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United States, U.S. unfair trade measures, particularly dumping duties, re-
duced U.S. manufactured imports by roughly twenty percent between 1980
and 1988.20 These barriers are expensive, and will cost the U.S. economy
an estimated $16 billion by the year 2000.21 The economic effect of anti-
dumping actions is particularly acute in the steel, electronics, textile, agri-
cultural and chemical sectors, which are most prone to antidumping action.
B. The Trend Toward Antidumping Litigation
As countries are forced to decrease tariffs and phase out other trade
barriers to comply with WTO rules, reliance on the WTO Antidumping
Agreement inevitably will increase. Historically, the United States, the
European Union, Canada and Australia, have been the primary users of the
antidumping law, accounting collectively for over two-thirds of the anti-
dumping cases initiated between 1990 and 1995.22 This statistic is conser-
vative because it does not include the annual "administrative reviews"
initiated by the United States pursuant to its unique retroactive dumping as-
sessment system;23 the United States initiates many more of these extensive
reviews in a given year than it does new investigations.24 This relatively
2OSee Daniel Thefler, Trade Liberalization and the Theory ofEndogenous Protection: An
Econometric Study of U.S. Import Policy, 101 J. POL. ECON. 151 (Feb. 1993). Imports into
the United States are not the only products negatively affected by antidumping laws. The
spread of the antidumping virus to other WTO Members increasingly threatens U.S. export-
ers, as discussed infra, which account for one in six U.S. manufacturing jobs.
21ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF ANTIDUMPING AND COUNTERVAILING DuTY ORDERS AND
SusPENsIoN AGREEMENTS, USITC Pub. 2900, Inv. No. 332-334 (June 1995).
22Between the years 1990 and 1995, the United States initiated 299 anti-dumping cases,
Australia initiated 265, the EU initiated 186 and Canada initiated 117. Committee on Anti-
dumping Practices, Report of the Committee Presented to the Contracting Parties, G L 123
(1996); Committee on Anti-dumping Practices, Report of the Committee Presented to the
Contracting Parties, GATT B.I.S.D. (40th Supp.) at 195, 201-204 (1995); Committee on
Anti-dumping Practices, Report of the Committee Presented to the Contracting Parties
(1994); Committee on Anti-dumping Practices, Report of the Committee Presented to the
Contracting Parties, GATT B.I.S.D. (39th Supp.) at 388, 393-95 (1993); Committee on
Anti-dumping Practices, Report of the Committee Presented to the Contracting Parties,
GATT B.I.S.D. (38th Supp.) at 82, 87-88 (1992); Committee on Anti-dumping Practices,
Report of the Committee Presented to the Contracting Parties, GATT B.I.S.D. (37th Supp.)
at 297, 301 (1991). Moreover, in the one year since the execution of the WTO Agreement,
the United States has initiated 13 antidumping proceedings, the EU has initiated 33, and
Canada has initiated 9, accounting for almost half of the total antidumping proceedings in
that period. WTO ANN. REP. 1996, at 104; see also John H. Jackson, Dumping in Interna-
tional Trade: Its Meaning and Context, in ANTIDUMPNG LAW AND PRACTICE: A
COMPARtATivE STUDY (John H. Jackson & Edwin A. Vermulst eds., 1989).
23See infra notes 147-48 and accompanying text.24The periodic retroactive "administrative reviews" analyze whether imports in the pre-
vious year, entered under a pre-existing antidumping order, were dumped, using the same
rigorous data collection procedures as in the initial dumping investigation. See the Import
Trade Administration's website at <http:llwww.ita.doc.gov/import-admin/records/stats> for
statistical information on new investigations and administrative reviews. For instance, in
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small traditional users group has successfully employed antidumping meas-
ures to protect its national industries for many years. Even developed
countries like Japan, which traditionally were critical of antidumping pro-
ceedings, have begun to utilize their antidumping laws.
Developing countries have learned well from this example and have
been gaining ground on the traditional users group. In a dramatic prolifera-
tion of the antidumping weapon, developing countries have been filing an-
tidumping actions against one another, and against members of the
26traditional users group, to the growing consternation of developed nations.
Having made great use of the antidumping weapon themselves, however,
the developed countries will have a hard time complaining about the acqui-
sition and use of this weapon by others.
In 1990, developing countries accounted for less than ten percent of
antidumping cases initiated, but by 1995 they accounted for forty-three per-
cent.27  Mexico has been cited often as an illustration of this trend. As
Mexico eliminated other barriers to trade, it became a frequent user of the
1996, the Commerce Department initiated only 21 investigations, but it completed 96 ad-
ministrative reviews in the same year. Likewise, in 1995, the Department initiated only 14
new investigations, but it completed 126 reviews. Id.25Although still critical of widespread use of antidumping measures, Japan has begun to
employ antidumping measures to protect its own industries. In 1993, Japan for the first time
decided to impose antidumping duties against imports of Ferro-Silico-Manganese from
China. It later brought the same case against Norway and South Africa. See Cabinet Order
regarding imposition of antidumping duty on Ferro-Silico-Manganese, Heisei-5, 2-Sei-15,
amended in part, Heisei-6, 12-Sei-15. In 1994, Japan brought another antidumping pro-
ceeding against cotton thread from Pakistan. See Cabinet Order regarding imposition of an-
tidumping duty on cotton thread, Heisei-7, 8 Sei-308; Customs Weekly Reports, Feb. 3, 12,
1993, Nos. 2087, 2089. See also WTO ANN. REP. 1996, at 104. See generally Norio Ko-
muro, Japan's First Anti-dumping Measures in the Ferro-Silico-Manganese Case, J. WORLD
TRADE, June 1993, at 5 (discussing the use of Japan's antidumping law in its first case).
These measures contrasted with Japan's actions in the early 1980s, when it initiated anti-
dumping investigations on both cotton thread (1982) and Ferro-Silico-Manganese (1983),
but later terminated both cases.26A report by the U.S. General Accounting Office highlighted the concerns of developed
countries regarding the spread of antidumping measures: "[Fearing possible abuse of these
laws, [countries with established procedures] have expressed concern over their adoption and
use by newly industrialized countries such as Mexico, South Korea and Brazil." See UNITED
STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL REQUESTORS:
COMPARISON OF U.S. AND FOREIGN ANTIDUMPING PRACTICES 10(1990).
27See GATT ANN. REP. 1994, at 28; WTO ANN. REP. 1996, at 104; see also BUSINESS
GUIDE TO THE URUGUAY ROUND supra note 8, at 202 ("Complaints of dumping ... are on the
increase in most developing countries implementing liberalization measures. While many of
these complaints are due to the inability of domestic industries, long accustomed to heavy
levels of protection, to adjust to the changed competitive situation resulting from the removal
of tariffs and other barriers, some complaints ... are undoubtedly genuine."). See generally
Shishni Astrana, The Dumping Ground, SMART INVESTOR, Feb. 17, 1997 (discussing a num-
ber of recent antidumping actions India has brought against developed and developing coun-
tries).
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antidumping weapon. 8 Between 1985 and 1990, Mexico initiated a total of
forty-five antidumping cases.2 9 Between 1990 and 1995, Mexico initiated
more than double that amount - 104.30 South Africa serves as another ex-
ample. In 1994, South Africa initiated nine antidumping measures.31 In
1995, it initiated twice as many - 18.32 Even China, which has been the
most frequent victim of antidumping actions, 33 has drafted antidumping
legislation, and has initiated its first antidumping case.34
A striking number of countries with no prior experience have adopted
antidumping regulatory regimes. In 1994, only twenty-five countries had
joined the GATT Antidumping Code and implemented antidumping legis-
lation. 5 By December 1996, that number rose five fold: there were 128
WTO Member countries, and the terms of the WTO Agreement require that
all must join the Antidumping Agreement and ensure adoption of con-
forming legislation.36  Twenty-eight other countries have joined working
parties to facilitate their accession to the WTO. 7 In the new millenium, it
is possible that virtually all sovereign countries will have joined the Anti-
dumping Agreement.
The long term trends support the expectation that antidumping cases
will increase.
28See Nancy E. Kelly, Mexico's Enhanced Trade Muscle: Did U.S. Furnish The Ster-
oid?, AM. METAL MARKET, Oct. 10, 1996, at I (discussing antidumping cases against the
United States, and fact that Mexican antidumping law is based largely on the U.S. system).
India and Pakistan have also increasingly used antidumping measures. See N. Vasuki Rao,
India and Pakistan Hit Back on Dumping, J. CoM., June 3, 1997, at 3A (discussing the
readying of import duties in both countries as apparent retaliation against Western trade
challenges).29GATT ANN. REP. 1994, at 28.
'Old.; WTO ANN. REP. 1995, at 31.
" WTO ANN. REP. 1995, at 31.
32 WTO ANN. REP. 1996, at 104.
33See WTO ANN. REP. 1995, at 32 (showing that exports from China were the targets in
20% of all cases in 1994); WTO ANN. REP. 1996, at 105 (showing that exports from China
were the targets in 15% of all cases in 1995).
34See Antidumping and Countervailing Regulations of the People's Republic of China,
issued Mar. 28, 1997 per State Council Order No. 214 in People's Republic Daily (Overseas
Edition), Mar. 29, 1997. For further discussion of China's new regulations, see China to
Establish Antidumping Rules to Protect State Industries, Daily Executive (BNA) No. 23, at
A-2 (Feb. 4, 1997). China initiated its first antidumping case against newsprint from the
United States, Korea and Canada on December 12, 1997. See INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Dec. 19,
1997, at 8.35 See Renato Ruggiero, The State of World Trade, Trade Policy and the WTO, Focus,
Dec. 1996, at 8.36See INFo. & MEDIA REL. Div., WTO, WTO Members, Focus, Jan. 1997, at 11; see also
infra note 130 and accompanying text.37See Ruggiero, supra note 35, at 8.
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1. Sources: 1994 GATT Annual Report by the Director-General;
1995 and 1996 WTO Annual Reports by the Director-General.
2. Reporting period is July to June of subsequent year.
3. Accounts for post-1994 South Africa cases.
As shown in Table 1, there has been a sharp increase in the number of
antidumping actions initiated in the 1990s when compared to the 1980s.38
Although the number of cases initiated will fluctuate from year to year de-
pending on the economic cycle, the trend appears unmistakable. The total
number of antidumping measures in force also increased by almost ten per-
cent between 1994 and 1995. 39
39Other factors affecting the volume of antidumping cases reported as initiated are:
(i) The transition period in implementing antidumping legislation may delay initiation
of cases. Members had to introduce new rules to implement the new agreement, and
national industries have awaited these rules before filing antidumping complaints. For
instance, it took the U.S. government over two years to issue final regulations imple-
menting the WTO antidumping rules. This transition process will be more difficult in
countries without prior antidumping experience.
(ii) Members may not provide the GATT/WTO with current reports of antidumping
cases they have initiated. Notification to the WTO has been incomplete m the past, and
it will be increasingly difficult for the WTO to monitor the actions brought by the dra-
matically expanded group of countries using the antidumping weapon.
(iii) Antidumping actions tend to vary countercyclically from the general economic
trend. Thus, from 1990-1993, a time of recession in many countries, antidumping ac-
tions increased significantly.
See Table 1.
The dip in antidumping actions after 1994 may be a result of all of these factors.39Compare GATT ANN. REP. 1994, at 10 (reporting almost 740 measures in effect as of
June 30, 1994), with WTO ANN. REP. 1995, at 14 (reporting 805 antidumping measures in
effect as of June 30, 1995).
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This growth trend is seen not only in the number of antidumping ac-
tions, but also in the number of countries undertaking antidumping actions.
As more countries add antidumping regimes to their domestic legislation,
and as other alternatives for protection are eliminated, the number of coun-
tries initiating antidumping actions each year has escalated rapidly - from
nine countries in 1990, it nearly doubled to sixteen countries in 1995.40
Contrary to conventional assumptions, many of these antidumping actions
target developed countries such as the United States and the EU.
41
The growing frequency of antidumping actions is likely to result in a
corresponding increase in the number of antidumping decisions contested
before the WTO Dispute Settlement Body ("DSB"). The WTO established
a new and improved binding dispute resolution procedure, under which a
complaining Member may request that a WTO panel render a ruling on
whether the laws, practices or decisions of another Member are consistent
with WTO obligations and principles.4 2 The WTO Antidumping Agree-
ment sets forth special rules for resolving disputes involving antidumping
cases. 43 The DSB rules are significant because they offer countries mean-
ingful recourse to an objective international tribunal when they believe their
exporters were unfairly subjected to dumping measures. Developing coun-
tries are especially encouraged by the binding nature of the DSB process,
because powerful industrialized countries can no longer block decisions fa-
vorable to exporters from developing countries.44 Of ninety-one requests for
consultations under the GATT between 1989 and 1994, twenty-five percent
related to antidumping actions.45 One can expect an even greater number
of antidumping disputes before the DSB, given the expected increase in the
volume of litigation46 as well as the increasing involvement of developing
countries. 47
40GATT ANN. REP. 1994; WTO ANN. REP. 1996, at 104.
41 In 1993-1994, the EU was the second most prominent target of antidumping investiga-
tions (accounting for 11% of all investigations initiated), and the United States was the fifth
most prominent target (accounting for 4.3%). See GATT ANN. REP. 1994, at 28. In 1995,
the EU was the target of 17.1 % of the investigations initiated, and the United States was the
target in 4.9 % of the investigations. See WTO ANN. RE. 1996, at 104-05.42See Dispute Settlement Understanding, supra note 1, at arts. 4.7, 16.4. See generally
Palitha T.B. Kohona, Dispute Resolution Under the World Trade Organization: An Over-
view, J. WoRLD TRADE, Apr. 1994, at 23. See infra notes 131-34 and accompanying text for
further discussion.43 See infra notes 131-34 and accompanying text.
44See Ruggiero, supra note 35, at 7 (WTO Director-General Ruggiero stating that "in a
marked change from the past, when the dispute settlement system was mostly used by devel-
oped countries, both developed and developing countries are actively using the system to
settle their trade disputes. This is a sign of increased confidence in the impartiality and ef-
fectiveness of the WTO's multi-lateral dispute settlement system.").45See WTO ANN. REP. 1995.
46 Only "final actions" normally may be referred to the WTO dispute resolution process,
and antidumping actions generally take over one year to complete and become "final." Ac-
cordingly, there will be a lag in dispute resolution of antidumping cases under the WTO.
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C. Other Less Significant Weapons
The WTO Agreement encompasses several Multilateral Agreements on
Trade in Goods.4  The three main agreements governing import protection
are: (i) the Agreement on Safeguards, (ii) the Agreement on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures (the "SCM Agreement") and (iii) the Agreement
on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade 1994 (the "Antidumping Agreement"). 4 9 The first two - the Safe-
guards and the SCM Agreements - are far less significant than the Anti-
dumping Agreement and are discussed in the following sections of this
article.
Trade-related disputes accounted for 16% of dispute resolution requests as of the first quarter
of 1996. See Overview of the State-of-Play of WTO Disputes, (visited Apr. 1, 1996)
<http:www.wto.org/wto/disputefbulletin.htm>. This lag was encountered in the Desiccated
Coconut case, a Dispute Settlement Understanding appeal of a countervailing duty action by
Brazil against imports from the Philippines. See WTO, Brazil-Measures Affecting Desic-
cated Coconut, 55/22/R (Oct. 17, 1996). In that case, WTO Dispute Settlement Understand-
ing rules were not yet applicable when the action was initiated, although duties in that action
were levied in 1995, after the WTO came into effect. Id.47See INFO. & MEDIA REL. Div., WTO, Developing Countries are Becoming Active Us-
ers of WTO Dispute-Settlement Rules, Focus, Mar.-Apr. 1996, at 1-2.48See Agreement on Trade in Goods, supra note 1.49Agreement on Safeguards, Apr. 15, 1994, Agreements on Trade in Goods, supra note
1, THE LEGAL TEx'rs at 315 [hereinafter Safeguards Agreement]; Agreement on Subsidies
and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Agreements on Trade in Goods, supra note 1,
THE LEGAL TExTs at 264 [hereinafter SCM Agreement]; Antidumping Agreement, supra
note 17. The WTO mandates that import protection measures must be authorized by the
Agreements on Trade in Goods. Accordingly, to the extent that national measures are incon-
sistent with the WTO Agreement, they are subject to challenge if used. For example, the
United States has on its books the Antidumping Act of 1916, 15 U.S.C. § 72, and Section
337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1337. The 1916 Act imposes on the plaintiff U.S.
industry the difficult burden of proving that importers knowingly imported dumped mer-
chandise with the intent to injure the domestic industry. It also permits successful plaintiffs
to collect substantial damages, which are not permitted under the WTO Antidumping
Agreement. The 1916 Act was virtually never used prior to the Uruguay Round. (U.S. anti-
dumping actions are taken under authority of the Antidumping Act of 1930 as amended, not
the 1916 Act. See infra note 147.) However, a U.S. steel company filed suit under the 1916
Act in late 1996 against the U.S. subsidiary of a German steel exporter. See Geneva Steel
Co. v. Ranger Steel Supply Corp., No. 96-C-774B, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14892 (C.D. Utah
Sept. 19, 1997). The European Union, on behalf of Germany, challenged the U.S. law at the
WTO as being inconsistent with any import protections permitted by WTO Agreements.
Nancy E. Kelley, Europe's Opposition in Trade Case Grows, AM. METAL MARKETS (Sept.
25, 1997).
Section 337 permitted U.S. companies to petition the ITC for an order excluding imports
of merchandise that infringed intellectual property rights and that were injurious to U.S. in-
dustry. Section 337 was successfully challenged in a 1988 GATT proceeding, GATT
B.I.S.D. (36th Supp.) at 345 (1989). Subsequently, the U.S. Congress amended the law in
1988, and again in 1994, to make it parallel with other U.S. patent infringement proceedings.
The injury requirement was eliminated. 19 U.S.C. § 1337.
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1. Safeguards
Article XIX of the GATT 1994, also termed the "Escape Clause," al-
lows Member States to provide temporary protection to domestic industries
facing increased import competition. Specific procedures for implementing
Article XIX and imposing safeguard measures were revised and set forth in
the Safeguards Agreement annexed to the WTO Agreement.50 The purpose
of these safeguard measures is to afford domestic companies time to im-
prove their position or shift their resources into another field.5 1 The draft-
ers of the Safeguards Agreement borrowed heavily from the existing U.S.
safeguards law."
a. Standards
Article XIX and the Safeguards Agreement authorize Members to re-
strict imports when they are in increased quantities which cause or threaten
serious injury to a domestic industry.5 3 The Safeguards Agreement speci-
fies that safeguard measures may only be taken in response to an increase in
imports; the increase can be absolute or relative to domestic production.:
Serious injury to the domestic industry is defined as "a significant overall
impairment to its position."5 5 The Safeguards Agreement injury test is in-
tended to be greater than the injury test in the Antidumping Agreement, but
ultimate discretion is left with the administering authority, which can effec-
tively lower the burden for a showing of injury. 6 Developing countries
50Safeguards Agreement, supra note 49.
511n addition to Article XIX, there are other "safeguard" measures under the WTO
Agreement. For example, Articles XII and XVII:B of the GATT 1994 permit restrictions on
imports to safeguard a country's external financial position and its balance of payments.
These provisions generally are available only to developing countries and then only in ex-
traordinary cases. Extraordinary protective measures also are permitted under Article XX,
which allows for protection of public morals, health, laws and natural resources, and Article
XXI, which allows for protection of national security. Because they are rarely used, these
extraordinary measures are not further discussed in this article. The standard safeguard
measures under Article XIX are available to all Member states, and therefore are likely to be
most relevant in the future as an import protection alternative to antidumping actions.
52In the United States, safeguard protections are provided under Sections 201-204 of the
Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2251-2254, which is administered by the ITC. The Trade
Act of 1974 served as a model for the Safeguards Agreement. For example, the definitions
of serious injury and threat in the Safeguards Agreement are based on Section 202 of the
Trade Act. 19 U.S.C. § 2252(c)(6)(C)-(D). Also, as under U.S. law, the Safeguards Agree-
ment requires a finding within 200 days of initiation of a safeguards investigation. 19 U.S.C.
§ 2252(d)(2)(D).
53S afeguards Agreement, supra note 49, art. 2. 1.
4Id. There is a significant difference between findings based on absolute and relative
import increases, as discussed infra in connection with compensation requirements.
5s Safeguards Agreement, supra note 49, art. 4.1(a). The Agreement defines threat of se-
rious injury as serious injury that is clearly imminent. Id. art. 4.1 (b).
561d., arts. 4-5. Unlike antidumping protection, which is premised on the need to offset
unfair pricing that is injurious, safeguards are conditioned only on injury to a domestic in-
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have the benefit of a de minimis exemption under the Safeguards Agree-
ment; individual developing countries comprising less than three percent of
total imports are exempt, provided that the aggregate share of developing
countries is less than nine percent of total imports.'
b. Remedy
If these standards are satisfied, WTO Members may impose safeguard
remedial measures to protect the domestic industry while it recovers or
shifts production to another sector.5 8  The primary safeguard remedies are
quantitative import restrictions and increased import duties.5 9 There are
important limitations on the import restrictions that may be imposed.
First, when Members apply the most common safeguard measure -
quantitative restriction of imports, or quotas - they normally must limit the
measure to bar only injurious imports; injurious imports are those that ex-
ceed the average quantity or value of imports over a three-year "representa-
tive" period for which statistics are available.60 The three-year period is not
specified and is left to national discretion, which could dilute this limita-
tion.
61
Second, remedies are subject to a "degressivity" requirement under
which they must be phased down at regular intervals as the domestic indus-
dustry irrespective of whether pricing is fair or unfair. The injury threshold for safeguard
actions is intended to be higher, because they affect "fair" priced imports. In a safeguards
injury investigation, there are several objective and quantifiable factors which are to be con-
sidered. Among them are: the growth rate in imports in absolute and relative terms; the in-
crease in import market share; and any changes in the level of sales, production,
productivity, capacity utilization, profits and employment of the domestic industry.571d. art 9.1.
58However, safeguard measures may not be imposed by one North America Free Trade
Agreement ("NAFTA") country against another unless the country makes an additional
finding that imports from the other NAFTA country account for a substantial share of total
imports, and contribute importantly to the injury to the domestic industry. See Sections 311,
312 of the NAFTA Implementation Act, 19 U.S.C. § 331 (1997). The United States made
such a finding with respect to Mexico in a safeguard action regarding broom com brooms,
discussed infra at note 90.
59See Safeguards Agreement, supra note 49, art. 5.1 and art. 6. If there is a finding of
critical circumstances, in which delay would cause considerable damage, a Member may im-
pose a provisional safeguard measure after making a preliminary determination (rather than
waiting for a comprehensive final ruling). Provisional measures can last only two hundred
days while the investigation is conducted and "should" take the form of tariff increases. Id.
art. 6.
6 Id. art. 5.1.
61 The United States stated that it does not read this requirement to mean three consecu-
tive years, indicating that it may be selective in choosing the "representative years," picking
the lowest volume prior years so as to ensure tough quotas. See The Uruguay Round Agree-
ments Act, Statement of Administrative Action, MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE
UNITED STATES TRANSMITTING THE URUGUAY ROUND TRADE AGREEMENTS, TEXTS OF
AGREEMENTS IMPLEMENTING BILL, STATEMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION AND REQUIRED
SUPPORTING STATEMENTS 656, 962-63 (1994).
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try adjusts. The Safeguards Agreement does not specify the extent or
schedule for phase-out over time, however. This determination is left to the
Member imposing the remedy.62
Third, Article XIX requires governments to suspend obligations on a
non-discriminatory, or Most Favored Nation, basis so that restrictions are
applied to all imports "irrespective of source." Quota shares normally must
be allocated proportionately among different countries on the basis of rela-
tive import levels during a representative period.63 This requirement limits
the imposing Member's freedom to concentrate restrictions on imports from
exporters it views as problematic, and may cause diplomatic difficulties if
many countries are affected by the measures. However, there is an excep-
tion to this non-discrimination requirement, which allows for more restric-
tive quota allocations when imports from certain countries have increased
on a "disproportionate" basis. This fairly nebulous exception opens the
gate to quota allocations targeted at specific countries.
64
Two other important limitations on the safeguard remedy - duration
and compensation - are discussed separately below.
c. Duration
The duration of safeguard measures also is limited - they may be im-
posed only for four years initially, with a possible four-year extension if the
injury is found to persist and the industry can show it has begun to adjust.
65
The absolute limit for safeguard actions is eight years, after which all meas-
ures must be removed. The only exception to this sunset provision is for
develo6ping countries, which may extend safeguards for a maximum of ten
years. To prevent circumvention of this limitation, the Safeguards
Agreement mandates that after a safeguard measure is terminated, a new
measure cannot simply be reimposed. Safeguard actions on the same prod-
uct generally may not be initiated for a period equal to the time period in
which the measures were in effect, and in any event cannot be reimposed
for at least two years.67
62Safeguards Agreement, supra note 49, art. 7.4. Measures may not be made more re-
strictive once they are imposed, even if extended. Id.
631d. art. 5.2(a).
64Id. art. 5.2(b). The United States stressed the importance of this provision to targeting
import restrictions at particular countries. See Statement of Administrative Action, supra
note 61, at 957-58.65Safeguards Agreement, supra note 49, art. 7.1-7.2. When safeguard measures are ap-
plied for more than three years, the administering authority must conduct a mid-term review
to ensure the measure is still necessary to prevent injury, or whether it should be withdrawn
or more swiftly phased out. Id. art. 7.4.
66Id. art. 9.2.
67Id. art. 7.5. There is a limited exception for safeguard measures of 180 days or less,
which can be applied only when one year has passed since imposition of the safeguard
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d. Compensation
One of the most significant restrictions on safeguard measures involves
compensation. Under prior GATT practice, compensation or retaliation
was available to a Member whose exports were restricted under Article
XIX, after a safeguard measure went into effect. Under the WTO Safe-
guards Agreement, there is an exemption from the collection of compensa-
tion or retaliation during the first three years after the imposition of a
safeguard measure. In other words, the Member imposing the measure
need not compensate the Member whose exports are subject to restriction
for three years. However, compensation is only deferred when the safe-
guard action is based on an absolute increase in imports and the measure
conforms with all other provisions of the Agreement. 69 Where it is based
on a relative increase, a targeted Member may seek compensation immedi-
ately. If no agreement on compensation is reached within thirty days, the
affected Member may retaliate by suspending "substantially equivalent"
concessions or obligations.7" The need to compensate the exporting coun-
try can be costly and can undercut the desirability of imposing the safe-
guard measure. The Antidumping Agreement, in contrast, imposes no such
requirement.
e. Effect on "Grey-Area" Measures
Under the prior GATT, safeguard measures were widely viewed as of
limited effect and were seldom used.71 Governments made less formal ar-
rangements, which allowed them to target particular countries, and extend
the protections beyond the maximum duration of a safeguard measure;
these arrangements are known as "grey-area" measures.72 Unquestionably,
the most significant feature of the new Safeguards Agreement is that it ex-
pressly prohibits grey-area measures that "afford protection" to the domes-
tic industry.73 To monitor the phase-out of existing grey-area measures, the
measure and the measure has not been applied on the same product more than twice in the
preceding five years. Id. art. 7.6.6 1Id. art. 8.3. The three year "cooling-off" period for an absolute increase in imports will
allow time for Members to consult under the agreement. Id. art. 12.691d. art. 8.3.
70Id. art. 8.2. Before retaliating, the Member must notify the WTO Council for Trade in
Goods. Id. The Council has 30 days during which it may disapprove of the retaliation. Id.71 See discussion accompanying infra notes 84-86.
72See generally Emesto M. Hizon, The Safeguard Measure! VER Dilemma: The Jekyll
and Hyde of Trade Protection, 15 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 105 (1994); see also BUSINESS
GUIDE TO THE URUGUAY ROUND, supra note 8, at 163-64.71 Safeguards Agreement, supra note 49, art. 11.1(b) n.4. For example, the prohibition on
grey-area measures essentially undercuts the United States' ability to impose unilateral
sanctions against WTO Members or force "voluntary" agreements under the controversial
Section 301 provision of U.S. law. 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1996). There is controversy regarding
whether the United States can utilize Section 301 to impose sanctions in areas not covered
by the WTO, such as anticompetitive practices. Even if the United States can permissibly
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Safeguards Agreement establishes the Committee on Safeguards ("Com-
mittee"), under the governance of the Council for Trade in Goods.74
Grey-area measures commonly are agreements to limit imports, in-
cluding voluntary export restraints, voluntary restraint agreements, orderly
marketing arrangements, and export-price or import-price monitoring sys-
tems.75 These "voluntary" agreements often were reached under duress af-
ter the importing country threatened to restrict shipments from the
exporting country. Many governments favored grey-area measures because
they were thought to be simpler, targeted, more diplomatic, and faster to
impose, with no limits on duration, no need to offer compensation and no
need to prove injury. Exporters often preferred grey-area measures to other
import protections as the lesser of evils; the exporters at least were guaran-
teed input in the negotiation of the agreement, and might benefit from price
76increases resulting from the quota restraint.
There were over 270 grey-area measures in effect as of 1989.77 This
figure is conservative, as many grey-area measures go unreported. A com-
parison with safeguard measures illustrates the popularity of the grey-area
measures. As of November 1994, less than ten safeguard measures re-
mained in effect under the prior GATT Agreement.
7
The WTO Safeguards Agreement reflected a growing consensus
among Members that grey-area measures were distortive non-tariff barriers,
which legitimized cartels and often injured the domestic industries they
were intended to protect.79 One example of a problematic grey-area meas-
ure is the 1977 orderly marketing arrangement regarding televisions which
the United States negotiated with Japan to protect the U.S. industry from
Japanese television imports. After the arrangement went into effect, the
source of imports simply shifted to Korea and Taiwan, and their market
shares dramatically increased over a one-year period from fifteen to fifty
percent.80 The prohibition on grey-area measures in the Safeguards Agree-
act against such practices unilaterally, however, it cannot do so via import duties or quotas
on goods (the preferred method of imposing sanctions under Section 301) because all such
retaliatory action would require approval of the DSB. See Dispute Settlement Understand-
ing, supra note 1, art. 23.2.
74 Safeguards Agreement, supra note 49, art. 11. The Committee also will monitor and
report on the implementation of the Safeguards Agreement and all safeguard actions initiated
and imposed.
75See generally Hizon, supra note 72, at 106 n.3.
76ld"
77GATT SECRETARIAT, Report on Developments in the Trading System, L/6530 at 91
(1989).
78GATT ANN. PEP. 1994, at 4.
79See ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT [hereinafter
OECD], COMPETrrION AND TRADE POLICIES: THEIR INTERACTION 12 (1984).
8 0Hizon, supra note 72, at 120 n.70. Other examples are the 1981 United States-Japan
automotive agreement, which reportedly paved the way for increased import competition in
the premium-price auto sector that was important to U.S. auto producers, and the 1983 Euro-
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ment is unequivocal, and specifically references orderly marketing ar-
rangements, voluntary export restraints and other arrangements regarding
exports or imports that "afford protection."
81
All grey-area measures in effect as of 1995 must be brought into con-
formity with the requirements of the Safeguards Agreement or phased out
before 1999.82 One specific national measure, the EU agreement with Ja-
pan on autos, may be maintained until December 31, 1999.83
f. Relationship with Antidumping Actions
Historically, safeguard actions have been dwarfed by antidumping ac-
tions. There were only 15 safeguard measures in effect as of mid-1993,
84compared to 662 antidumping measures in effect at that time. Further,
unlike antidumping cases, safeguard actions are on a downward trend. The
number of safeguard measures in effect declined by more than half by the
end of 1994, from fifteen to seven. 85 Moreover, these seven safeguard
measures, which were in force on the effective date of the WTO, must be
terminated by January 1, 2000, under the terms of the Safeguards Agree-
ment.86 Only three safeguard measures have been imposed under the WTO
Safeguards Agreement.
Although many of the WTO Members have implemented new domes-
tic safeguard legislation, it is unlikely that there will be a siguificant in-
crease in safeguard actions due to the limitations on safeguard remedies and
the requirement that countries imposing safeguards pay compensation.8
The Safeguards Agreement's prohibition on grey-area measures is most
pean Community-Japan video recorder agreement which was widely viewed as causing in-
creased prices without protecting the European video industry. Id.81 Safeguards Agreement, supra note 49, art. 11.1(b). The specificity of this prohibition
was intended to clarify the general prohibition on quotas contained in Article XI of the
GATT.
821d. art. 11.2. Measures may only be retained through 1998 if they are notified to the
WTO. Cyprus, the EU, Korea, Slovenia, South Africa and Thailand notified the Committee
that they maintained grey-area measures. WTO ANN. REP. 1996, at 100.83 Safeguards Agreement, supra note 49, art. 11 annex.
"See GATT ANN. REP. 1994, at 10, 28. See also BusINass GUIDE TO THE URUGUAY
RouND, supra note 8, at 200. Two hundred and fifty antidumping cases were initiated in the
preceding year alone. See GATT ANN. REP. 1994, at 10.
8 See GATT, GUIDE TO GATT LAW AND PRACTICE, ANALYTICAL INDEX 539 (6th ed.
1995). This total was comprised of three actions by South Africa, three by the EC (one dat-
ing back to 1958) and one by Nigeria (dating back to 1961). Id. at 539-542.86See Safeguard Agreement, supra note 49, art. 7.
17The three countries that have notified the Safeguards Committee as to the application
of safeguard measures are Brazil, Korea and the United States. See WTO ANN. REP. 1996,
at 100.
88At the end of 1995, 60 WTO Members had notified the Committee that they had im-
plemented safeguards legislation. See id. See supra notes 58-70 and accompanying text for
a discussion of the limits on safeguard remedies.
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likely to lead to an increase in antidumping actions as the most attractive
remaining alternative for protection. Antidumping actions, like grey-area
measures, permit the targeting of specific countries, and the imposition of
protective measures of indeterminate duration, without compensation re-
quirements. 89
The United States' experience is illustrative. Safeguard actions under
the original U.S. escape clause law were not popular, and there currently is
only one outstanding U.S. safeguard measure. 0 The United States also
initiated one unsuccessful safeguard action in 1995 - the tomato case. In
that case, U.S. tomato producers failed to prove injury by reason of surging
89Antidumping measures may subsume grey-area measures. Voluntary export restraints
in the form of quantitative restrictions and tariff-rate quotas arguably are permissible, pro-
vided they are formed under authority of the Antidumping Agreement. Antidumping
Agreement, supra note 17. In particular, Article 1 l(l)(c) of the Safeguards Agreement, su-
pra note 49, provides that the prohibition on grey-area measures does not apply to measures
"sought, taken or maintained" pursuant to the other WTO Multilateral Trade Agreements,
including the Antidumping Agreement. Article 8 of the Antidumping Agreement, in trm,
provides that antidumping actions may be settled through voluntary "price undertakings"
between the parties. Article 8 states, in part, that antidumping actions may be teminated
upon the entry of voluntary undertakings to "cease exports to the area in question at dumped
prices so that the authorities are satisfied that the injurious effect of the dumping, by dimin-
ishing the quantity of dumped imports, is eliminated." Antidumping Agreement, supra note
17, art. 8. While Article 8 appears to permit only price-based agreements, it also can be in-
terpreted to permit volume-based import quotas - quotas that effectively cease the "injuri-
ous effect" of dumping, "by diminishing the quantity of dumped imports," upon the
termination of a case. Id. Accordingly, Article ll(1)(c) arguably shields quotas from the
Safeguards Agreement's ban on grey-area measures. Although such an interpretation is at
odds with the prevailing view of Article 11 and is subject to challenge, this possible excep-
tion is yet another reason why Members may be more inclined to initiate antidumping ac-
tions under the WTO. In the post WTO-period, quantitative antidumping settlement
agreements have been entered only with countries deemed to be non-market-economies such
as Russia and the People's Republic of China, which are not WTO Members. These cases
have not raised the legality of such quotas within the WTO context.
9°This one U.S. safeguard case involves broom corn brooms. See Report to the President
on Investigations Nos. TA-201-65 and NAFTA-301-1; Broom Corn Brooms, 61 Fed. Reg.
42264 (1996). The United States increased tariffs on most broom corn broom imports after
the ITC ruled that imports of broom corn brooms were a substantial cause of injury to the
U.S. domestic industry. Id. The President accepted the ITC proposal to increase the tariffs
on broom com brooms for three years for all countries other than Canada and Israel which
were specifically excluded based on their minimal shares of imports and their lack of contri-
bution to injury. See Proclamation No. 6961, 61 Fed. Reg. 64429 (1996). The ITC in-
creased tariffs on broom corn brooms to the highest bound rate for the prior three year
period, to facilitate the efforts of the U.S. domestic industry to make a positive adjustment to
import competition. Even this one action was not without controversy, however. The safe-
guard measure primarily affected Mexican imports, and Mexico lodged a challenge under
the NAFTA dispute resolution procedures. See Notice, 62 Fed. Reg. 6035 (1997). Colum-
bia also challenged the safeguard measure at the WTO before the Dispute Settlement Body.
See Columbia files WTO Action over Imported Brooms to US, J. COM., May 5, 1997, at 2A.
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imports, primarily from Mexico. 91 Tellingly, the U.S. industry then brought
a successful antidumping case against Mexican tomato imports.92
2. Antisubsidy Measures
Another import protection mechanism permitted under the WTO
Agreement is the antisubsidy measure. Like safeguard measures, antisub-
sidy measures are noteworthy, but are substantially less significant than an-
tidumping measures. Under the WTO SCM Agreement, 93  Member
governments may take protective measures against imports benefiting from
certain types of "subsidies," in the exporting country. The SCM Agreement
defines subsidies generally as financial contributions or other government
measures (such as price supports or tax breaks) that "confer a benefit 94 and
are "specific" to a particular industry.95
The WTO SCM Agreement significantly revised the anti-subsidy rules
under the prior GATT agreement, and these revised rules, in combination
with other recent developments, have altered and diminished the effect of
antisubsidy measures. The discussion below provides an overview of the
substantive WTO rules governing antisubsidy measures and then assesses
the effect of these measures, and their relationship to antidumping actions.
a. Substantive Rules
The SCM Agreement divides subsidies into three categories, and pro-
vides for two types of enforcement measures.96
91 This safeguard investigation was terminated following a negative injury finding by the
ITC. The ITC determined that increased tomato imports were not the substantial cause of
serious injury nor did they threaten injury to the U.S. industry. Fresh Tomatoes and Bell
Peppers from Mexico, 61 Fed. Reg. 42652 (1996); Fresh Tomatoes and Bell Peppers,
USITC Pub. No. 2985, Inv. No. TA-201-66 (1996).
92After obtaining preliminary dumping margins on Mexican tomato imports ranging
from 4% to 188%, 61 Fed. Reg. 56607 (1996), the U.S. domestic complainants agreed to
settle the case by means of a suspension agreement under which Mexican producers must
report periodically to the U.S. Commerce Department that they are selling above a minimum
price. See Tomatoes from Mexico, 61 Fed. Reg. 56617 (1996). The suspension agreement
freezes the antidumping investigation so long as the terms of the agreement are met.93 See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
94See SCM Agreement, supra note 49, art. 1.1(a)(1) (defining financial contributions);
id. art. 14 (defining benefits).
95See id. art. 2. In other words, if the benefit is "generally available" to domestic indus-
tries at large, it would not be deemed an actionable subsidy. However, subsidies that are
nominally available generally, but in effect disproportionately benefit a specific sector, may
be deemed actionable.
96 See generally Terrence J. McCartin, Red, Yellow or Green: GA 7T 1994"s Traffic Light
Subsidies Categories, 19 Practising Law Institute 611 (1994); see also WTO ANN. REP.
1995, at 102.
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(1) Three Categories of Subsidies
(a) "Green Light" Subsidies - The SCM Agreement for the first time
designates a category of permissible or "green light" subsidies.97 These are
subdivided into three types.
(i) Research and Development - The SCM Agreement explicitly
permits direct government support for certain "pre-competitive" basic R&D
or other industrial research.98
(ii) Underdeveloped Regions - The SCM Agreement also explic-
itly permits subsidies to underdeveloped regions, provided that the subsi-
dies are based on "neutral and objective criteria" of what constitutes an
"underdeveloped" region, and they are not specific to one region.99
(iii) Environmental Adaptation - The new SCM Agreement also
permits governments to partially compensate domestic industries for their
efforts to adapt to specific environmental regulations.1°°
(b) "Yellow Light" Subsidies - This second category of subsidies is
actionable if the subsidies cause "adverse effects." However, the Agree-
ment does not prohibit yellow light subsidies. 01
(c) "Red Light" Subsidies - The SCM Agreement expressly prohib-
its two types of subsidies irrespective of any effect - first, those that are
conditioned on export performance, 02 and second, those conditioned upon
local content.0 3
97See SCM Agreement, supra note 49, art. 8.2.
9 See id. art. 8.2(a). A subsidy must not be for more than 75% of industrial research, and
50% of pre-competitive research, as defined in the SCM Agreement. See id. art. 8.2(a),
n.24-25.
99See id. art. 8.2(b). Such subsidies previously were actionable under the GATT.
'OoSee id. art. 8.2(c). The subsidies are limited to 20% of the adaptation costs. Id. art.
8.2(c)(v).
'0o See id. at arts. 5 and 6. "Adverse effects" include injury to the domestic industry, nul-
lification or impairment of GATT rights, or other "serious prejudice." Id. art. 5.1. Article 6
defines "serious prejudice" and also sets forth four types of subsidies which are presump-
tively deemed prejudicial: substantial subsidies, subsidies covering operating losses to an in-
dustry or to a particular company on a recurring basis, and subsidies relieving debt liability.
Id. art. 6.1. The presumption is rebuttable. See id. art. 6.2.
'02Id. art. 3.1(a). See generally id. at Annex I (providing an illustrative list of prohibited
export subsidies).
'°3 See id. art. 3.1(b). In other words, subsidies cannot favor domestic over foreign mer-
chandise and inputs.
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(2) Two Types of Antisubsidy Enforcement Measures
(a) WTO Measures - One way to contest subsidized imports is
through the WTO dispute resolution process. With respect to both yellow
and red light subsidies, a complaining Member State may request consulta-
tions with the Member conferring the alleged subsidy under the WTO Dis-
pute Settlement Understanding." If no resolution is reached, the SCM
Agreement provides for the establishment of a dispute settlement panel. 05
The timetable for WTO panel proceedings on complaints regarding red light
subsidies is swifter, 10 6 and the burden of proof is lower,10 7 reflecting the ne-
gotiators' view that these are more insidious than yellow light subsidies.
When the Dispute Settlement Body ("DSB") adopts a panel report agreeing
that a challenged subsidy is actionable, the complaining country is author-
ized to take appropriate countermeasures.10 8
Green light subsidies are more difficult to contest. Members may
challenge only the categorization of a subsidy as "green light."10 9  They
may not challenge the subsidy outright, if the host country previously noti-
fied the Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures of the sub-
sidy and claimed green light status.1 0 The complaining Member must
present its argument on the green light classification to the Committee,
rather than a DSB panel.1 If a green light classification is upheld, the
complaining Member may obtain compensation only if it convinces the
Committee that it has suffered "serious adverse effects," a higher standard
than for the other subsidy categories.
1 2
(b) Domestic Countervailing Duty ("CVD") Investigations - The
second type of enforcement countermeasure allows Members to challenge
allegedly subsidized imports through their own domestic CVD legislation.
1'4Article 4 provides for consultations regarding red light subsidies, and Article 7 pro-
vides for consultations regarding yellow light subsidies. Id.
'0I°d arts. 4.4, 7.4.
'06 For example, there is a thirty-day deadline for consultations regarding red light subsi-
dies, id. art. 4, whereas there is a sixty-day deadline for yellow light subsidies, id. art. 7.4.
Similarly, in red light proceedings the panel has 90 days to issue a report, whereas it has 120
days regarding yellow light subsidies. Id. art. 7.5.
"°7In yellow light proceedings, as opposed to red light proceedings, the complaining
country must establish the requisite adverse effects. In red light proceedings, adverse effects
are assumed. Id. art. 5.
'0sSee Brazil Measures Affecting Desiccated Coconut, supra note 46. Countermeasures
in a WTO proceeding, unlike a national CVD proceeding, evidently may not include the im-
position of countervailing duties. See SCM Agreement, supra note 49, part V.
109See SCM Agreement, supra note 49, art. 8.
"°See id. art. 8.3. This committee, comprised of delegates from all SCM Member coun-
tries, normally meets twice a year. See id. art. 24.1.
.. See id. art. 8.4.
112See id. art. 9.1.
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Members may obtain relief through only one of the two types of counter-
measures. 
1 13
Domestic CVD actions differ significantly from WTO proceedings. In
a domestic CVD action against a red light subsidy, there is no presumption
of injury so that the complainant must establish not only that a red light
subsidy exists, but also that the subsidy causes or threatens material in-
jury. 14 Further, green light measures which have been notified to the Sub-
sidies Committee may not be challenged via domestic subsidy legislation. 115
A domestic CVD action normally is a more effective countermeasure
than a WTO action, for several reasons. First, a private domestic party may
file a complaint to initiate a CVD investigation against targeted imports,
whereas only a Member government may initiate a WTO proceeding
16
Second, a Member may impose import duties to directly countervail subsi-
dized imports pursuant to domestic CVD law, as opposed to WTO dispute
resolution, which normally entails less specific prospective remedies such
as compensation or withdrawal of the subsidy measure. 17  Third, the do-
mestic industry may perceive its likelihood of success in challenging a sub-
sidy before domestic agencies to be better than in a multilateral WTO
context.'18
b. Effect of Antisubsidy Measures and Relationship with Antidumping
Actions
Antisubsidy measures imposed under authority of the SCM Agreement
and the GATT have had a relatively small impact on trade, as compared to
antidumping actions. Antisubsidy measures are not commonly applied by
most countries. The United States has been the predominant user of anti-
subsidy measures, generally through domestic CVD legislation. It initiated
sixty percent of total cases worldwide between 1983 and 1994,119 and ac-
"13See id. art. 10 n.33. While a Member may pursue both tracks simultaneously at the
outset, i.e., the WTO dispute resolution process and a domestic CVD investigation, it must
choose between the two before seeking relief.
14See McCartin, supra note 96, at 655 (stating that there is a presumption of injury for
red light subsidies in WTO proceedings).
1
5 See SCM Agreement, supra note 49, part V. See also McCartin, supra note 96, at
647. If the measures have not been notified to the Committee, the complaining party is free
to countervail the subsidy if it determines the subsidy is not "green."
116 See SCM Agreement supra note 49, art. 11. Domestic industries injured by subsi-
dized imports may file a CVD case themselves, and need not convince their national gov-
ernments to pursue the issue at the WTO. Domestic industries thus have some control over
the prosecution and timing of the case.
117As noted supra text accompanying note 108, countervailing duties evidently would
not be permitted as countermeasures for parties who prevail in WTO panel proceedings, un-
der Section V of the SCM Agreement.
18McCartin, supra note 96, at 611.
9 See WTO ANN. R p. 1995, at 13. Australia and Canada, together with the United
States, accounted for over 95% of CVD actions initiated in the same period. Id.
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counted for roughly eighty percent of the CVD measures in force as of June
of 1995.
Use of CVD countermeasures generally has been limited and declin-
ing, as shown in Table 2.








1985- 1986- 1987- 1988- 1989- 1990- 1991- 1992- 1993- 1994-
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
1. Sources: 1994 GATT Annual Report by the Director-General;
1995 WTO Annual Report by the Director-General.
2. Reporting period is July to June of subsequent year.
There are several reasons for this decline. The most frequent targets of
U.S. CVD actions are its large Latin American trading partners such as Ar-
gentina, Brazil and Mexico, as well as the European Union countries.120 In
more recent years, these countries have significantly reduced their vulner-
ability to antisubsidy actions by eliminating government subsidies and pri-
vatizing state industries, as a result of new market-oriented government
policies and fiscal limitations on the ability to confer subsidies. Another
reason for the decline is that many developing countries, by signing the new
WTO SCM Agreement, now are entitled to an injury test before counter-
vailing duties can be imposed.121 The injury test requirement makes CVD
actions more difficult to pursue, and therefore less attractive to domestic in-
dustries. Under the previous GATT Subsidies Code, countries that were not
signatories to the Code generally were not entitled to an injury test in do-
120GATT ANN.RFP. 1994, at 11.
121In 1994, there were 25 signatories to the GATT Subsidies Code. See GATT ANN.
REP. 1994, at 10. On January 1, 1995, all 123 original WTO Members became signatories of
the WTO SCM Agreement.
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mestic CVD actions; this rendered their exports an easy target for com-
plaining industries, which did not need to show they were materially injured
by reason of the subsidized imports before obtaining protective CVD du-
ties.1 22 Another factor relevant to the decline in CVD actions is that they
generally result in significantly lower duties than antidumping investiga-
tions, affording less protection to domestic industries.
123
It is no wonder then that antidumping actions have become increas-
ingly popular, while antisubsidy measures have fallen off, as illustrated in
Table 3.







1991-1992 1992-1993 1993-1994 1994-1995
1. Sources: 1994 GATT Annual Report by the Director-General;
1995 and 1996 WTO Annual Reports by the Director General.
2. Reporting period is July to June of subsequent year.
'2For example, the United States imposed duties on numerous Argentine imports with-
out examining whether the imports injured the U.S. domestic industry, because Argentina
was not a signatory to the prior Subsidies Code under the GATT at the time of the investiga-
tion. See, e.g., Oil Country Tubular Goods from Argentina, 49 Fed. Reg. 46564, 46565
(1984). Countries that were not signatories to the GATT Subsidies Code could request an
injury test if they signed an agreement with equivalent commitments.
123For example, in the United States, CVD margins normally are in the single digits,
whereas antidumping duty margins commonly are in the double digits. Compare the anti-
dumping cases Freshwater Tail Meat from the People's Republic of China, 62 Fed. Reg.
48218 (1997) (margins of 91.5%) and Vector Supercomputers from Japan, 62 Fed. Reg.
55392 (1997) (margins of 173.08% to 454.0%) with the CVD cases Oil Country Tubular
Goods from Italy, 60 Fed. Reg. 40822 (1995) (country-wide ad valorem rate of 1.47%) and
Certain Pasta from Italy, 61 Fed. Reg. 38544 (1996) (ad valorem rates ranging from 0.0 to
11.23%).
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The SCM rules immunizing green light subsidies will further reduce
the effectiveness of antisubsidy actions. Moreover, under the SCM Agree-
ment, the act of privatizing state industries may extinguish certain subsidies
previously deemed actionable. 124  These factors, and prevailing interna-
tional policies against large government subsidies and state-owned industry,
should ensure that the trend of diminished or diminishing antisubsidy ac-
tions continues for the foreseeable future. 2 5 As Table 3 illustrates, antisub-
sidy actions are marginal import protections, when compared to
antidumping actions.
I. OVERVIEW OF THE ANTIDUMPING REGIME
A. Introduction
The advantages and availability of antidumping relief relative to other
protective measures demonstrates why the antidumping regime is and will
continue to be the most important and popular international import protec-
tion measure. Antidumping actions are popular because it is relatively easy
to file a successful complaint, to directly target specific competitors, and to
impose duties that have a direct and sustained price effect on specific mer-
chandise and may even act as market barriers. A closer look at the rules
applicable to antidumping actions therefore is warranted.
B. The WTO Antidumping Agreement
The fundamental principles of the antidumping regime were set out in
Article VI of the GATT of 1946, as detailed in an antidumping code that
was periodically revised at the various GATT negotiating sessions. 126 The
WTO Agreement contains a new and comprehensive antidumping frame-
work - the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (the "Antidumping Agreement"),
which replaced all former antidumping codes.
124See Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(5) (1994); Saarstahl AG v.
United States, 858 F. Supp. 187, rev'd, 78 F.3d 1539 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Certain Carbon Steel
Products From Sweden; Final Results of Countervailing Duty Administrative Review, 62
Fed. Reg. 16549 (1997).
'25However, there could be an increase in CVD actions against countries such as Russia
and China, when they graduate from non-market economy ('NME") status. Currently, be-
cause they are deemed NMEs, they are not subject to CVD actions. For an example, see the
discussion in the recent U.S. antidumping case against Russian magnesium. Notice of Final
Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value: Pure Magnesium From Ukraine, 60 Fed.
Reg. 16432 (1995).
126See supra notes 14-17 and accompanying text.
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1. Comprehensive Membership
A significant difference between the WTO Antidumping Agreement
and the former antidumping codes under the GATT is that all signatories to
the WTO Agreement were required to accede to the Antidumping Agree-
ment as part of the single undertaking of WTO Membership. 127 This re-
sulted in a dramatic increase in the number of players in the international
antidumping game. In 1994, there were 25 signatories to the GAIT Anti-
dumping Code, 128 and just two years later, in 1996, there were 128 signato-
ries to the WTO Antidumping Agreement. 129 All signatories to the
Antidumping Agreement were required to ratify national legislation con-
sistent with commitments in the Agreement.
130
Although the Antidumping Agreement is flexible, providing each
Member country with discretion to establish a unique national antidumping
regime, it nonetheless requires Members to adhere to core substantive and
procedural precepts, to ensure a substantial degree of consistency and uni-
formity among the various Members' regimes. The legal discipline of the
Antidumping Agreement is especially relevant for developing countries and
new signatories that had no previous procedural or substantive antidumping
rules.
The following discussion will focus on the generally applicable WTO
rules, as opposed to the varying national laws implementing the VTO
Agreement.
2. Binding Dispute Resolution
Another significant difference between the WTO Antidumping
Agreement and the prior GAIT antidumping codes is that the current WTO
rules are enforceable under binding dispute resolution pursuant to the new
Dispute Settlement Understanding. 31 The WTO Antidumping Agreement
127 See WTO ANN. REP. 1995, at 14.
128See GATT ANN. REP. 1994, at 10.
129 See WTO ANN. REP. 1995, at 13; see <http://www.wto.org/wto/aboutlorgansn6.htm>
for a listing of Members and the dates on which they joined the WTO.
130As part of the "single undertaking" rule, each WTO Member must accede to all WTO
Multilateral Agreements in Annexes 1-3 of the WTO Agreement, including the Antidumping
Agreement. See Final Act, supra note I at para. 2 (requiring signatories to submit the WTO
Agreement to their "competent authorities" for approval), and the WTO Agreement, supra
note I, at arts. XIV.1-2 and XVI.4 (requiring conformance with, and acceptance and imple-
mentation of, the Multilateral Agreements). The Antidumping Agreement, supra note 17,
art. 18.4, explicitly requires each Member to "take all necessary steps ... to ensure the con-
formity of its laws, regulations and administrative procedures with the Antidumping Agree-
ment." See also BusiNEss GUIDE TO THE URUGUAY ROUND, supra note 8, at 15.
131 Under Article 16.4 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding, supra note 1, decisions
(i.e. reports) issued by dispute settlement panels become effective (i.e. are adopted) unless
all Members of the DSB agree unanimously (i.e. by consensus) not to adopt the report. In
practice, this means that the decisions of panels will virtually always be adopted and binding
on the parties. Under the prior GATT rules, adoption of panel reports required unanimous
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contains special rules setting forth the standard of review in dispute resolu-
tion proceedings involving antidumping actions. These special rules seek to
strike a balance between, on the one hand, affording discretion to the na-
tional authorities actually implementing the antidumping rules and, on the
other hand, ensuring that national authorities are imposing antidumping du-
ties in conformity with the WTO Antidumping Agreement. 132 The United
States was the major proponent of a special deferential standard of review
for national antidumping proceedings, and was largely successful.
133
Article 17 of the WTO Antidumping Agreement sets forth special rules
which supplement the general rules of the Dispute Settlement Understand-
ing in antidumping proceedings. Article 17 provides that: (i) factual deter-
minations of national authorities in antidumping cases will not be disturbed
by WTO panels unless establishment of the facts was "improper" or their
evaluation was "biased," and (ii) legal interpretations of national authorities
in antidumping cases will not be disturbed provided they are "permissible,"
even if there is more than one possible interpretation.
34
approval by Members, and thus any individual Member could "block" a panel decision from
becoming effective. The losing side of a dispute usually had every incentive to block adop-
tion of unfavorable reports. For example, a GATT dispute resolution panel ruled in favor of
Mexico when it challenged a U.S. antidumping action against cement exports from Mexico
to the United States. The United States, the losing party, "blocked" adoption of this report,
which never became binding on the United States. United States Antidumping Duties On
Grey Portland Cement and Cement Klinker from Mexico, 1992 WL 762944 (July 9, 1992).
132These conflicting interests were evident in the United States during the drafting of the
WTO Antidumping Agreement. See generally William D. Hunter, WTO Dispute Settlement
in Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Cases, 18 Practicing Law Institute 547 (1994)
(providing an interesting discussion of U.S. negotiating objectives with regard to establish-
ing standards for WTO panel review of national antidumping determinations, told from the
perspective of a U.S. negotiator). Certain U.S. domestic industries were concerned that
WTO panels would run roughshod over decisions of the U.S. administering authorities
which, as noted above, have generally been favorable to the domestic industry; the domestic
industries pushed for a standard of review that provided unusual deference to administering
authorities. See GAYT Partners Work Out Compromise on Controversial Dumping Issue,
INsIDE U.S. TRADE, Dec. 14, 1993, at 1-2. U.S. exporters, on the other hand, wanted WTO
panels to have ample authority to intervene and reform antidumping regimes in other coun-
tries that were deemed arbitrary, non-transparent or unfair. Id. The domestic industries pre-
vailed in the U.S. debate, and achieving a special, deferential standard of review became a
U.S. negotiating objective. Id.
1331d.
134 See Antidumping Agreement, supra note 17, art. 17.6. The insertion of this contro-
versial review standard in the Antidumping Agreement, to be applied only to antidumping
proceedings, as a supplement to the normal Dispute Settlement Understanding rules applica-
ble to all other disputes under the WTO, indicates the special sensitivity of antidumping ac-
tions at the WTO. See Hunter, supra note 132.
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C. The Antidumping Precepts
The rules under the WTO Antidumping Agreement, while detailed and
complex, may be reduced conceptually to several fundamental principles
and a standard procedural framework. These are discussed below.
1. The Antidumping Proceeding
An antidumping investigation commences after the national authority
accepts a petition from a complaining domestic industry (or an appropriate
representative) alleging that a designated type of merchandise 3 imported
from one or more countries: (i) is being sold in the national market at
dumped (i.e., "unfairly" low) prices, and (ii) those sales are materially in-
juring the domestic industry, or are threatening material injury. 36 The na-
tional authority may only "initiate" an investigation if it is satisfied that the
complaint provides a prima facie case supporting a dumping finding, and
has notified the government of the targeted country.
137
Upon initiation, the national authority must investigate whether the
domestic industry has been materially injured or threatened with injury by
reason of the targeted merchandise. 8 It also must separately investigate
whether the targeted exporters are "dumping. 139 The Antidumping Agree-
ment sets forth a timeframe for provisional measures and final determina-
tions of dumping and injury, as well as rules for public disclosure of these
determinations (transparency). 140 It also lays out detailed substantive rules
and standards for making the findings.
The national authority 41 has broad discretion in conducting the year-
long investigation. It will select for investigation the exporters of the sub-
'35The Antidumping Agreement applies only to trade in goods, as part of Annex IA.
Agreement on Trade in Goods, supra note 1. The Antidumping Agreement does not apply
to trade in services, which is covered by Annex lB. See Agreement on Trade in Services,
supra note 1.
136See Antidumping Agreement, supra note 17, art. 5.
137'd.
13 See id. art. 3.
139Id. art. 2.
140 See infra text accompanying notes 199-206.
4" The Antidumping Agreement leaves to the WTO Members' discretion the establish-
ment of a national institutional structure for administering the antidumping law, referring
only to "the authorities" where relevant. See Antidumping Agreement, supra note 17, art.
2.2.1 n.3. "Authorities" are defined "as meaning authorities at an appropriate senior level."
Id. Members generally implement the dumping regime through executive agencies or min-
istries, rather than through the legislature or judiciary. Some countries divide the responsi-
bilities for making injury determinations and dumping determinations between separate
administrative entities, and some do not. For example, the United States and Canada dele-
gate to the Department of Commerce and Revenue Canada, respectively, responsibility for
making dumping determinations, and to the International Trade Commission and Canadian
Import Tribunal, respectively, responsibility for making injury determinations. In contrast,
the EC Commission, Australian Customs Service and Mexican Commercial Secretariat are
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ject product from the targeted country (generally all known exporters, or
those comprising at least a majority of total exports).142  It will issue to
subject companies a questionnaire requesting sales and cost information for
the "investigation period" preceding initiation (generally one year for
dumping, although the injury analyses can involve a longer period). Af-
ter the questionnaire responses are submitted, the national authority may
send auditors to conduct an on-site visit to the exporting company to verify
the accuracy of the data submitted. 144 When the national authority is not
satisfied with the substance, calculation or form of the information submit-
ted, it may use so-called "facts available" i.e., it may reject the submitted
information and use alternative information that generally is adverse to the
exporting company.
14
If both the dumping and injury investigations result in an affimative
determination, the national authority may impose a definitive antidumping
duty. Virtually all countries except the United States use a "prospective"
system, under which the authority imposes final or "definitive" duties on
imports, on a prospective basis.146 The United States, however, administers
a retroactive system under which importers are responsible for paying de-
posits. Each year, exporters, importers or the U.S. domestic industry may
request an "administrative review" of the imports in the prior year to deter-
mine the actual dumping duties owed. 147 If the determination in the retro-
authorized to make both dumping and injury determinations. See Edwin A. Vermulst, The
Antidumping Systems ofAustralia, Canada, the EEC and the USA: Have Antidumping Laws
Become A Problem in International Trade? in ANTIDumpING LAW AND PRACTICE: A
COMPARATIvE STUDY 425-76 (John H. Jackson & Edwin A. Vermulst eds., 1989).
142 Antidumping Agreement, supra note 17, art. 6.10.
'4Id. art. 6.1. See also id. art. 2.2, n. 4. The U.S. ITC, for example, generally considers
a three-year period in making its injury assessment. See, e.g., Certain Brake Drums and
Rotors, USITC Pub. No. 3035, Inv. No. 731-TA-744, at 11 (Apr. 1997); Melamine Institu-
tional Dinnerware, USITC Pub. No. 3016, Inv. No. 73 1-TA-741-743 (Feb. 1997); Bicycles
from China, USITC Pub. No. 2968, Inv. No. 73 1-TA-73 (June 1996).
144See Antidumping Agreement, supra note 17, art. 6.7. See also id. at Annex I (Proce-
dures for On-The-Spot Investigations pursuant to paragraph 7 of Article 6).
145See id. art. 6.8. See also id. at Annex II (Best Information Available in terms of para-
graph 8 of Article 6). Although Annex II sets forth general guidelines intended to prevent
the arbitrary imposition of punitive "facts available," particularly where the form rather than
the substance of submitted information is at issue, the Annex nevertheless affords great dis-
cretion to the national authority to determine when a party is "cooperative" and thus whether
to use facts available. Id.
146 Under a prospective system, refunds may be requested through the conduct of a re-
view, but importers generally are not liable for higher duties retroactively. See id. art. 9.3.2.
147See Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, § 751, 19 U.S.C. § 1675 (1994). The United
States implemented the WTO Agreement commitments via the Uruguay Round Agreements
Act (URAA), Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 108 Stat. 4809 (1994). U.S. obligations under the An-
tidumping Agreement were implemented in §§ 201-234 of the URAA, as an amendment to
the Tariff Act of 1930. For an informative discussion of U.S. implementation of the Anti-
dumping Agreement, see David Palmeter, United States Implementation of the Uruguay
Round Antidumping Code, J. WORLD TRADE, June 1995, at 39.
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active review is that the actual amount owed is more than the amount de-
posited, the importer must pay the difference with interest. The amount ret-
roactively assessed can be huge - much higher than the deposited amount
- enough to bankrupt a firm. The retroactive system thus has a unique and
significant protectionist effect because at the time of import, the importer
cannot know its actual liability for antidumping duties, and this uncertainty
can effect its willingness to purchase from targeted suppliers. Surprisingly,
the U.S. retroactive system was not challenged during the Uruguay Round
negotiations, and no country has emulated this system, despite its protec-
tionist effect.
148
The Antidumping Agreement permits national authorities to settle an-
tidumping complaints through "price undertakings. 149  In these undertak-
ings, exporters normally agree to comply with minimum export prices in
exchange for the suspension or termination of the antidumping action.150
2. The Antidumping Methodology
a. Comparison
The national authority determines whether dumping is occurring by
comparing the export price of subject merchandise with the "normal value"
of the merchandise (the exporter's home market price, third country price or
a constructed price).151 In order to achieve an equitable comparison, the
Antidumping Agreement mandates a comparison of ex-factory starting
price for sales of the same or similar product S2 to the first unrelated cus-
148 The Antidumping Agreement contemplates and permits a retroactive system. See Anti-
dumping Agreement, supra note 17, art. 9.3.1, 10. The administrative burden of conducting
frequent reviews may explain why other countries have not emulated the U.S. system.
1491d. art. 8.
'sold. Some Members are more amenable to price undertakings than others. For in-
stance, the United States has a policy discouraging price undertakings such as suspension
agreements due to the drain on administrative resources, (although in certain high profile
cases, such as those involving steel, the United States has accepted settlement agreements).
The European Union, on the other hand, takes a more favorable view of possible settlement
agreements, reflecting its more informal, conciliatory approach. Price undertakings nor-
mally require exporters to sell above certain floor prices, to avoid dumping, which are based
on the exporter's production costs, and are verified through the submission of periodic cost
and price information to the national authority. These floor prices can be set on a country-
wide basis, such as in the EC price undertaking with Japan concerning Dynamic Random
Access Memory Semiconductors (DRAMs), or on a company-specific basis such as the EC
price undertaking with Korea concerning DRAMs. The floor price also can be based on the
domestic complainant's prices, to avoid injury, such as in the U.S. Suspension Agreement
with the Russian Federation concerning uranium. Settlement agreements are supposed to
involve "price" undertakings, rather than quotas or limitations on the volume of exports. But
see supra note 89 (discussing the possible interpretation of Article 8 to permit quantity based
undertakings).
51 Antidumping Agreement, supra note 17, art. 2.2.
'521d. art. 2.4.
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tomers in the export market and the comparison market during the investi-
gation period.1 53 This requires the national authority to adjust prices by de-
ducting transportation expenses, selling expenses and, if necessary,
differences in physical characteristics between products and trade levels.
154
Selling expenses normally are distinguished between direct (those directly
tied to the sale such as commissions, credit and royalty) and indirect (fixed
expenses such as salaries and general warranty). The Antidumping Agree-
ment requires these expenses to be calculated based on the actual records of
the responding firm (i.e., estimates or accruals generally are not accept-
able).'5 Direct expenses generally are applied precisely on a sale-by-sale
or customer-by-customer basis for all sales in the investigation period,
whereas indirect expenses normally are allocated over revenue and then ap-
plied as an average. Such intricate, per-unit calculations involving myriad
transactions generally would never be done for normal business purposes,
and can be manipulated to inflate the antidumping margin.
15 6
b. Export Price
The export price is the targeted exporting company's price to an unaf-
filiated customer for consumption in the domestic market of the importing
country. 5 7 The export price may be the sales price to a purchasing agent or
trading company in the exporting country for shipment to the importing
country. More typically, it is the price to a buyer in the importing country.
Because of the requirement that the customer must be unaffiliated, the ex-
port price may be based on the resale price of the exporter's sales subsidiary
in the importing country (rather than the exporter's price to its subsidi-
ary).'5 8 Sales through subsidiaries are deemed "constructed export price"
transactions because all of the expenses of the subsidiary (including any
further manufacturing and profit) must be deducted from its resale price in
order to "construct" an ex-factory starting price.
1 59
c. Normal Value
The benchmark to which the export price is compared is termed "nor-
mal value," and may be derived in several manners. The first priority under
the Antidumping Agreement is to select comparable sales in the exporting
company's domestic or "home" market. The home market will only be
1531d. arts. 2.3, 2.4.
154Id.
'55 1d. art 2.2.1.1.
156 Richard Wright, Validity of Antidumping Remedies - Some Thoughts, in ANIDUMPING
LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 141, at 425, 451 (explaining that the calculation of antidumping
adjustments has displayed "a tilt towards finding dumping").
157Antidumping Agreement, supra note 17, art. 2.3.
1
58 Id.; see also GATT, supra note 14, Annex I, art. VI, para. 1.
159Antidumping Agreement, supra note 17, arts. 2.3, 2.4.
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used, however, when there are sufficient sales (i.e., at least five percent of
the amount sold to the importing country) 16° of comparable or "like" mer-
chandise (i.e. identical or similar models). 161 The national authority may
investigate whether home market sales are made below the cost of produc-
ing the product. 62  Sales below cost in substantial quantities may be re-
jected as a basis for comparison. 63 If home market sales cannot serve as a
basis for comparison, the national authority may elect either to use export
sales to third countries or, alternatively, to calculate a constructed of the
value exported merchandise. In the case of "non-market economy" coun-
tries in which home market prices and costs are deemed unreliable, authori-
ties may use special market-based "surrogate values"; market reforms in
traditional non-market economies such as Russia and China, will cause
these provisions gradually to fall into disuse.'
64
d. Cost of Production/Constructed Value
Cost of production is the total of the manufacturing cost (the "actual"
cost of materials, labor and overhead incurred in producing the merchandise
sold in the comparison market) plus selling, general and administrative ex-
penses. 165 Net prices in the exporter's home market are measured against
this cost benchmark. If home market prices cannot be used for comparison,
normal value may be "constructed" from the cost of production of the mer-
chandise sold to the importing country plus the profit earned in selling the
merchandise.
166
National authorities normally require actual product-specific costs and
profit, and generally will not accept standards or budgeted amounts.16 7 As
many manufacturers use a process cost accounting system and do not derive
actual per-product costs, this requirement often means that a company must
make a painstaking recalculation of product costs for antidumping pur-
poses. Moreover, the Agreement's requirement of "fully loaded" produc-
tion costs (including fixed overhead), rather than variable or marginal costs,
'6 Id. art. 2.2 n.2.
1611d. art. 2.6. ("[A] product which is identical, i.e., alike in all respect to the product un-
der consideration, or in the absence of such a product, another product which, although not
alike in all respects, has characteristics closely resembling those of the product under consid-
eration.").
1621d. art. 2.2.1.
16 3 Id. See infra notes 227-30 and accompanying text.
164GATT, supra note 14, Annex I, art. VI para. 1 (permitting alternative "surrogate" meth-
odologies for normal value when the state has a monopoly over trade and fixes prices). See gen-
erally 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c) (1994) (providing an example of an NME provision in U.S. law).
165Antidumping Agreement, supra note 17, art. 2.2.1.
'66Id. art. 2.2.2.
167 Id. The use of actual profit was based on the practice previously in effect in the EU. See
Wright, supra note 156, at 447. This provision was added by countries critical of the prior U.S.
system which imposed a mandatory minimum amount for general and administrative expenses
(ten percent) and profit (eight percent) even if actual amounts were lower.
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contradicts normal business practices and may create dumping margins.
168
National authorities have substantial discretion to "adjust" an exporter's re-
ported full costs, particularly where the exporter is forced to depart from its
normal accounting system to derive per product costs. These adjustments
can have a significant effect on the antidumping margin calculated.' 69
Because normal value can be based on home market price or con-
structed value, the exporter must bear in mind that it can still be found
guilty of dumping even if (i) its export price is above home market price
and (ii) its export price is above production cost.
3. The Antidumping Margin Calculation
After the national authority has determined the appropriate normal
value and has derived the adjusted ex-factory unit prices, it will calculate
the dumping margin. Export sales are compared to normal value, on an av-
erage or transaction-specific basis.170  The foreign-denominated normal
value then is converted to the currency of the export price using the ex-
change rate in effect on the date of the export sale. 171 To prevent currency
exchange movements from creating dumping margins, the agreement al-
lows for adjustments to compensate for significant short-term exchange rate
fluctuations, or to lag for the sustained long-term appreciation of the cur-
rency of the exporting country.
Average unit export prices generally are subtracted from average unit
normal value, on a product-by-product basis, to measure the dumping
amount. When the net export price for a product is higher than the normal
value, the margin amount for the product normally is set to zero (i.e., the
exporter is not given credit for a "negative" margin). When the net export
price is less than normal value, a quantity-weighted dumping margin is cal-
culated. The margins for sales of all product types are tallied to derive a
total dumping margin. This margin serves as the basis for the antidumping
duty, although the methodology for imposing the duty varies among the
Members, who are afforded significant discretion. Some Members collect
the duty on all subject entries, while others collect only on entries priced
168Antidumping Agreement, supra note 17, art. 2.2.1; see also Alan V. Deardorff, Eco-
nomic Perspectives on Antidumping Law, in ANrmUMLING LAW AND PRACICE, supra note 141,
at 23, 33.
169 See Wright, supra note 156, at 449 ("[lIt may be unrealistic to expect an economically ra-
tional cost of production/constructed value analysis for what has become, in essence, a subtle
web of import protection decisions."). See also id. at 445-46 ("[W]hen the cost of production is
calculated in an arbitrary manner ... antidumping rules can easily be abused for protectionist
purposes and - by inflating the normal value - lead to establishment of dumping margins
where none (should) exist").
'70Antidumping Agreement, supra note 17, art. 2.4.2.
171Id. art. 2.4.1.
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above a minimum normal value.' 72 The Antidumping Agreement requires
that separate margin rates be derived for each exporting company where
possible, but the authority has discretion to sample selected exporters when
it cannot examine them all.173 For those exporters in the targeted country
that were not specifically investigated, an "all others" duty is applied.' 74
The national authority has discretion not to impose an antidumping
duty, or to reduce the amount calculated, if it deems such measures appro-
priate.7 s The Antidumping Agreement encourages, but does not require,
the national authority to impose a "lesser duty" than the full dumping rate
calculated when a lesser amount is sufficient to offset the injurious effect of
the dumping. 176  The Antidumping Agreement also permits the considera-
tion of consumer and public interests in setting the antidumping duty
amount. 77 This consideration can be an important part of the antidumping
proceeding in certain countries, such as the Member States of the EU.
178
172 For example, the EU collects an ad valorem duty amount as a percentage of the export
price. Canada and Australia established a minimum normal value, and collect only when import
prices exceed this minimum. The EU, Canada and Australia collect the duties on a prospective
basis i.e., the margins calculated for past imports during the investigation period serve as the ba-
sis for duties in the future. See Mark Koulen, Some Problems of Interpretation & Implementa-
tion of the GA7T Antidumping Code, in ANrDUMPING LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 141, at
336, 371. The United States uses the antidumping margin from the investigation to calculate an
ad valorem rate and collect "deposits" on imports. The actual antidumping margin for the spe-
cific entry may be determined later, if an "administrative review" is conducted. See supra note
147 and accompanying text. If no review is conducted, the duty is assessed at the deposit
amount. Id.
1
73See Antidumping Agreement, supra note 17, arts. 6.10, 9.2.
'741d. art. 9.4.
175Id. art. 9.1. While the authority has discretion to reduce the antidumping duty, it cannot
impose a duty exceeding the antidumping margin amount calculated. Id. art. 9.3.
1761d. art. 9.1. This "lesser duty" rule is merely "desirable" and is not a requirement un-
der the Antidumping Agreement. Some Members, such as the United States, disregard this
provision and routinely impose the full amount of the antidumping duty calculated, without
considering whether a lesser amount would be sufficient to remove injury. Article 15 of the
Antidumping Agreement requires that "special regard" be given to developing countries be-
fore applying antidumping duties, when the duties would affect their "essential interests";
however, there is no case on record in which this article was the basis for fashioning a "con-
structive remedy".
'7id. art. 6.1.2.
178EU antidumping regulations require the consideration of the "community interest."
Council Regulation 384/96 of 22 December 1995 on Protection Against Dumped Imports from
Countries not Members of the European Union, art. 21, 1996 O.J. (L 356) 1, 18. As EU Mem-
bership expands, the interests of its constituent Members diverge. The consideration of commu-
nity interest can serve as an opportunity for EU countries opposed to an antidumping measure to
seek to reduce or eliminate the margin. See Jean-Frangois Bellis, The EECAntidumping System,
in ANrDUMPNG LAW AND PRACrIcE, supra note 141, at 41, 61-62. The EU Commission deci-
sion not to impose antidumping duties on cotton imports from China, India, Pakistan, Egypt, In-
donesia and Turkey serves as a "case study" in the politics of EU trade. Id. While France and
other Mediterranean countries favored tariffs on behalf of the European cotton and weaver in-
dustries, Germany, Great Britain and other Northem European countries opposed duties on be-
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The reader may observe that this calculation is rather hypothetical and
not particularly realistic or fair. The comparison of "constructed" prices
and costs can create dumping margins where none otherwise exist.
4. Injury Analysis
a. Injury Standard
Under the Antidumping Agreement, the national authority must assess
the impact of dumping on the domestic industry by examining both (i) the
volume of subject imports deemed to have been dumped, and (ii) the effect
of these imports on domestic prices and producers. 179 The national author-
ity must examine the absolute and relative volume of subject imports as
compared to domestic production or consumption. Where import volume
from a particular country is "negligible," i.e., accounting for less than three
percent of total imports, the investigation must be terminated as to that
country, unless there are a significant number of "negligible" countries."s
In analyzing price effect, the national authority must consider a number of
factors, including price undercutting and price depression by dumped im-
ports. The factors for considering the effect of dumped imports on domes-
tic producers include trends in sales, market share, capacity utilization, and
profits, as well as employment and investment levels.1 81 The national
authority also may give consideration to the magnitude of the dumping
margin in assessing the effect on domestic producers.
182
The national authority conducts the investigation of injury on as nar-
row a product range as possible.183 However, the Antidumping Agreement
explicitly permits the national authority to "cumulate" the effect of dumped
imports from more than one country under investigation. 18 4 This provision
reflects U.S. policy, and has been criticized as attributing to all suppliers,
half of downstream consumer industries. See Lionel Barber & Jenny Luesby, France Reopens
Wounds on Cotton Tariff, FIN. TIMES, May 28, 1997, at 6.
179 Antidumping Agreement, supra note 17, art. 3.
"Ol1d. art. 5.8. Technically, countries lose their "negligible" status if imports from negligible
sources account collectively for more than seven percent of total imports; the national authority
may cumulate them with larger suppliers irrespective of the fact that individually they account
for a small portion of the imports. This provision is intended to prevent "death from a thousand
cuts."
'1 Id. art. 3.4.
182Id. This factor reflects the practice of certain commissioners of the ITC in the United
States. See, e.g., Certain Brake Drums and Rotors, USITC Pub. No. 3035, Inv. No. 731-TA-
744, at 16-17 (Apr. 1997); Melamine Institutional Dinnerware, USITC Pub. No. 3016, Inv.
No. 731-TA-741-743, at 25 n. 160 (Feb. 1997); Bicycles from China, USITC Pub. No. 2968,
Inv. No. 73 1-TA-73 1, at 12 n. 84 (June 1996).
183 See Antidumping Agreement, supra note 17, art. 3.6.
1841d. art. 3.3.
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even "innocent" ones, the bad act of a single significant "injurious" sup-
plier."'85
After assessing these factors, the national authority must determine
whether the domestic industry is: (i) materially injured, (ii) threatened with
material injury, or (iii) is materially retarded in its establishment. 186 Al-
though not defined in the agreement, "material" injury is deemed injury that
is consequential and unambiguous.18 7 "Threat of material injury" is defined
in the Antidumping Agreement to mean a situation where injury is "clearly
foreseen and imminent" and not merely "conjecture or remote possibil-




In addition to analyzing the materiality of injury, the investigation also
must assess whether dumped imports are causing the injury to the domestic
industry. Before making an affirmative injury determination, the national
authority must demonstrate the causal relationship "between the dumped
imports and the injury to the domestic industry." 190  The Antidumping
Agreement also requires the national authority to examine "any known
factors other than the dumped imports" which also may cause the injury,
such as non-dumped import volumes and contraction of demand.19 1 The
national authority must not attribute these causes to dumped imports. The
authorities must provide opportunities for persons other than interested par-
ties, such as industrial users and consumer organizations, to provide infor-
mation regarding injury and causality.
19 2
"'8 Id. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(G) (1994). Many exporters criticize this provision be-
cause even if the exporters show that the exports from their country are not injurious, the ex-
porters may be deemed to cause injury when they are "cumulatively" assessed with exports
from other countries. See Vermulst, supra note 141, at 456-57.
116Antidumping Agreement, supra note 17, art. 3 n.9.
1I8See, e.g., 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7) (1994).
188 Antidumping Agreement, supra note 17, art. 3.6.
89 "Material retardation" is conceptually more nebulous than the "threat" standard, since
it does not even require that a domestic industry exist as a condition precedent to an affirma-
tive injury finding. Id. art. 3.
19Id. art. 3.5. However, national authorities such as the ITC in the United States read
this provision to require that dumped imports must merely be "a" cause of injury among
other factors, not the only cause. Certain commissioners at the ITC do not separately ana-
lyze the causation question, but rather consider material injury and causation together as part
of a "unitary" econometric analysis. See, e.g., Certain Brake Drums and Rotors, USITC
Pub. No. 3035, Inv. No. 731-TA-744, at 15 n.87 (Apr. 1997); Melamine Institutional Din-
nerware USITC Pub. No. 3016, Inv. No. 731-TA-741-743, at 23 n. 148 (Feb. 1997); Bicy-
cles from China, USITC Pub. No. 2968, Inv. No. 731-TA-731, at 12 n. 88 (June 1996).
191Antidumping Agreement supra note 17, art. 3.5 (emphasis added).
1921d. art. 6.12. However, from a cynical perspective, the Antidumping Agreement does not
require the authority to give any weight to submissions by consumer interests.
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The WTO Antidumping Agreement made a number of significant
changes to the prior antidumping rules embodied in the GATT Antidump-
ing Code. The significant changes are discussed below.
D. Major Substantive Changes and Clarifications Under the WTO
Antidumping Agreement
1. Notice, Standards and Participation
One of the important changes wrought by the WTO Antidumping
Agreement was the establishment, for the first time, of standards and time-
tables to ensure procedural transparency. In addition to substantive stan-
dards for dumping and injury determinations, the Antidumping Agreement
also sets forth minimum evidentiary prerequisites for initiation of an inves-
tigation.193  Initiation must be supported by a detailed description of the
targeted merchandise and evidence of dumping and injury.
The Antidumping Agreement also requires notification to interested
parties of the initiation of the proceeding,19 release to interested parties of
the full text of the dumping complaint,' public notification of the prelimi-
nary and final determinations, 196 and disclosure to interested parties of the
basis for the calculation of the antidumping margins. 197 When documents
cannot be released to interested parties because of the confidentiality of the
information contained in them, the Agreement provides that the parties
submitting confidential documents must also submit non-confidential sum-
maries. 1' This important provision enhances the participation of interested
parties and allows respondents and complainants some idea of the argu-
ments and information submitted against their interests during the proceed-
ing so that they may prepare a response or defense.
The Antidumping Agreement provides interested parties with the op-
portunity to participate meaningfully in the proceeding. The Agreement re-
quires that targeted exporters and importers be given a sufficient amount of
time to respond to questionnaires from the national authority (at least thirty
days)' 99 and that exporters which did not receive a questionnaire be given
an opportunity to provide the necessary information voluntarily if practica-
'931d. art. 5.2.
194Article 5.5 of the Antidumping Agreement provides for notification to the Member gov-
ernment prior to initiation of an investigation against an exporter of the Member, and Article
12.1 provides for general notice to the public upon initiation. Antidumping Agreement, supra
note 17. These provisions require that the notification set out in detail the basis for the initiation.
'95Id. art. 6.1.3.
1961d. art. 12.2.
'97Id. art. 6.9. The Antidumping Agreement also requires the authority to maintain the con-
fidentiality of submitted proprietary information. Id. art. 6.5.
'981d. art. 6.5.1.
'9Id. art. 6.1.1.
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ble.2° The Agreement also provides that the national authority must afford
interested parties "ample opportunity" to present evidence in writing.20 1 In
particular, it affords interested parties opportunities to present argument and
rebuttal, and to review all contrary evidence on the record.0 2 The Agree-
ment clarifies the procedures for on-site verification in the exporting coun-
try, including advance notification of the information the national authority
seeks to review.0 3
The Antidumping Agreement also sets out mandatory timeframes for
major decisions to ensure the timely and predictable conduct of the anti-
dumping proceeding. National authorities may not impose preliminary or
provisional measures sooner than two months after initiation and, once im-
posed, these measures may not apply for more than four months unless sig-
nificant exporters request a two-month extension.2°  The final
determination and definitive duties normally should be imposed within one
year after initiation, and in no case may an investigation last longer than
eighteen months.20 5 Finally, the Agreement provides that all Members must
maintain procedures for judicial or arbitral review of national antidumping
determinations, to afford respondents recourse to a tribunal where they may
appeal decisions of the national authority.
20 6
2. Standing
A domestic interested party may file a complaint only if it acts on be-
half of the domestic industry. The Antidumping Agreement specifies the
requisite degree of domestic support. An antidumping complaint is deemed
supported by the domestic industry only if: (i) it is supported by the pro-
ducers who account for not less than twenty-five percent of the total do-
mestic production, and (ii) the supporting producers constitute more than
fifty percent of the producers expressing a position concerning the case.207
2
00Id. art. 6.10.2. However, the Antidumping Agreement does not require the national
authority to accept and use such voluntary questionnaire responses.
201See id. art 6.1. Moreover, as discussed above, the Agreement also ensures that down-
stream industries and consumer representatives will have the opportunity to present information.
Id. art. 6.12.
202See id. arts. 6.2, 6.4.
203See id. art. 6.7, annex I.2041d. arts. 7.3, 7.4. If the national authority is considering whether to impose a lesser duty
necessary to prevent injury, the provisional measures may be extended for an additional six and
nine months, respectively. Id. art. 7.4.
20 Id. art. 5.10.
2 06 1d. art. 13.2071d. art. 5.4. U.S. law gives labor an equal voice with management, allowing unions to
support, or oppose a petition. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1673a(c)(4)(A), 1677(a)(D) (1994). When man-
agement and labor of a company are in direct opposition, the company will presumably be
treated as neither in support of, nor in opposition to, the petition. For predominantly union-
ized industries, particularly those represented by a single union, this provision may provide
petitioners with an otherwise unavailable basis for satisfying the new standing requirements.
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Domestic producers related to subject foreign producers or who import
subject merchandise may be disregarded in determining support or opposi-
tion, unless they demonstrate that their interests as domestic producers
would be adversely affected by an antidumping order.208
The burden is on the complainants to demonstrate the requisite levels
of support, to ensure that a prolonged, disruptive investigation is not initi-
ated if it does not represent the wishes of the domestic industry.0 9 This re-
quirement was added primarily to reform prior U.S. practice, pursuant to
which complainants were assumed to represent the domestic industry unless
210proven otherwise.
3. Sunset Provisions
Under the prior GATT Antidumping Code, there was no mandatory
duration or limit to antidumping measures. In their national laws, some
Member countries provided for automatic termination of antidumping
measures, but others provided no basis for elimination of antidumping du-
ties once imposed.211
To remedy this problem, the Antidumping Agreement provides for a
"sunset" review five years after the date of the imposition of antidumping
duties. In a sunset review, the national authority must revoke an anti-
dumping duty unless it determines that dumping would be likely to continue
The WTO Antidumping Agreement recognizes, but does not explicitly approve, petitions by
unions, merely stating that Members are "aware" of the practice. Antidumping Agreement,
supra note 17, art. 5.4 n.14. This could lead to a WTO challenge of an initiation based on
union support alone.
208 See Antidumping Agreement, supra note 17, art. 4.1(i).
2
09Id. art. 5.4. The national authority must decide whether a complaint has been filed on
behalf of an industry before initiating an investigation. Id. art. 5.1. The Antidumping
Agreement does not mention whether (and how) potential respondents will be notified of
their opportunity to comment on or challenge the claims of complainants. It therefore ap-
pears that in most cases, exporters will learn of the case only after it is initiated, and the op-
portunity to comment on standing has lapsed.210Under pre-WTO practice, the U.S. national authority presumed that a petitioner repre-
sented the domestic industry unless the exporters could prove that a majority of the domestic
industry opposed the case, a very difficult burden for the exporters to bear. This led to com-
plaints by other GATT Members that U.S. actions were not properly supported. See, e.g.
Unpublished GATT Panel Report, United States - Antidumping Duties on Imports of Stain-
less Steel late From Sweden, Committee on Antidumping Practices, ADP/l 17, 1994
GATTPD LEXIS 6 (Feb. 24, 1994) (in which a GATT panel ruled that the United States had
initiated an antidumping case against steel from Sweden without sufficient industry support;
the United States blocked adoption of the report).
211 Some Members provided for the automatic termination of duties after a set period of
time (three years in the case of Australia). See Vermulst, supra note 141, at 438 n.36. This
was not, however, a requirement under the prior GATT Antidumping Code, and antidump-
ing duties could continue indefinitely, particularly when the complainant industry was op-
posed to revocation of the duty. Id. at 438-39.
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or recur, and that injury would be likely to continue or recur, in the event of
212revocation.
In its analysis of the likely continuation or recurrence of injury, the na-
tional authority may analyze the likely volume and price effects of subject
imports on the domestic industry if the antidumping duty is revoked. This
economic analysis will be prospective and hypothetical, and will not in-
volve a current injury analysis.2 3 Significantly, mere improvement in the
domestic industry will not necessarily mean injury is unlikely to recur.
In the analysis of the likely continuation or recurrence of dumping, the
national authority may consider the weighted average dumping margin de-
termined in the investigation, and low or improved margins will not auto-
matically result in a decision to terminate. The authority has discretion to
consider changes in economic conditions to determine whether dumping
nevertheless may recur in the future. The fact that dumping existed at the
time the duty was imposed five years before should not, by itself, indicate
likely recurrence of dumping if the order is revoked.
Although sunset reviews will be mandatory, Members have discretion
to administer them in a narrow manner that makes it difficult for respon-
dents to establish that dumping and injury are not likely to recur. The sun-
set requirement nevertheless provides a new and significant opportunity for
exporters to eliminate longstanding duties.214
4. "New Shipper" Reviews
The WTO Antidumping Agreement, for the first time, provides export-
ers which did not export during the period of investigation (and which are
not related to such exporters), with the right to request an accelerated re-
view in order to receive an individual dumping margin.215 The new "accel-
erated" process will allow new suppliers to request a review twice annually,
and pending the results of the review, the new shippers need only post a
bond rather than pay definitive duties.216 This procedure affords new sup-
pliers time to prepare for, and obtain, a favorable antidumping decision,
relative to "old" exporters which may have been locked out of the market
due to high margins. New shippers normally must have some imports be-
fore a review will be conducted.
212Antidumping Agreement, supra note 17, art. 11.3.
213The national authority has discretion to consider a variety of factors in issuing this
determination, including whether any improvement in the state of the industry is related to
the antidumping duty, the magnitude of the margin, and unused production capacity, existing
inventories, and potential product-shifting. Id. art. 3.4.
214 Sunset determinations must be made quickly, within one year of initiation. Id. art.
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5. Minimum Thresholds
The Antidumping Agreement also provides important new minimum
thresholds for imposing antidumping duties.
a. De Minimis Dumping
The Antidumping Agreement for the first time enumerates a de mini-
mis dumping level, below which products are deemed to be "fairly" priced.
That level is two percent of export value.1 7 Antidumping margins must be
two percent or higher in order for dumping duties to be imposed.218 The
national authority must terminate a case as to exporters with de minimis
margins.
b. Negligibility
The Agreement delineates a specific negligibility standard for injury
determinations. When the import volume from a country is three percent or
less of total imports, that country's imports are deemed "negligible." The
national authority normally must terminate cases as to countries with negli-
gible import levels.
219
6. Equitable Price Comparisons
The Antidumping Agreement specifies that export and normal value
price comparisons must be made on an apples-to-apples basis - either av-
erage price-to-average price, or transaction price-to-transaction price.220
The purpose is to ensure a fair comparison of prices on the same basis.
Using average prices for a product category also allows exporters the bene-
fit of offsetting dumped export sales prices with export prices that are above
normal value within the same averaging category. When different prod-
217 1d. art. 5.8. The U.S. Department of Commerce ("DOC") has taken the position that it
will apply the new rule only in investigations. Because actual dumping liability is deter-
mined in administrative reviews and not investigations, this restriction effectively ensures
that a lower de minimis threshold - 0.5% - will apply in U.S. proceedings to determine
the definitive duty. 19 C.F.R. § 353.106(c). This DOC position, based on a questionable
interpretation of language in the WTO Agreement, almost certainly will be challenged under
the new WTO dispute resolution procedures.2,8 Antidumping Agreement, supra note 17, art. 5.8.
219 Id. As discussed supra note 180, this exclusion does not apply when negligible import
sources collectively account for more than seven percent of imports.
2
201d. art. 2.4.2. However, the national authority may disregard the new rule when it
finds a pattern of export prices which differs significantly among purchasers, regions or time
periods. As free market prices often quite naturally vary between regions or time periods,
national authorities have substantial discretion to disregard the "apples-to-apples" price re-
form.
221 As with the de minimis standard, the United States has taken the position that it will apply
the average-to-average comparison only in investigations, not administrative reviews. See supra
note 217. In reviews, the United States will use its preexisting methodology of comparing aver-
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uct categories exist, however, authorities may decide not to permit the off-
setting of dumping in one product group with negative margins on the
other. A negative margin exists when normal value is lower than the ex-
port price. Nevertheless, while subject to certain exceptions, the new WTO
rules on comparison methodology will add fairness to the calculation of an-
tidumping margins.
7. Start-Up Operations
During the negotiation of the WTO Antidumping Agreement, countries
with significant semiconductor industries such as Japan and Korea argued
for an adjustment for distortions in production costs due to capital intensive
start-up operations. The start-up of a new production line or facility nor-
mally involves unusually high costs and low production quantities which
are temporary and do not reflect normal production. The prior GATT Code
did not provide for a start-up adjustment, and the consequent use of high
start-up costs in the dumping calculations would inflate antidumping mar-
gins.
While the Antidumping Agreement does not define "start-up," to ob-
tain an adjustmen s a producer normally must be using a new production
facility or producing a new product line requires substantial additional in-
vestment. Improvements to existing facilities or products generally will
not be sufficient.
The startup period normally will end at the point when commercial
production reaches a level that is characteristic of the merchandise, pro-
ducer or industry, and not necessarily when production is at optimum ca-
pacity utilization. Measurement of the end of start-up can be critical, and is
highly discretionary. Developed countries such as the United States have
taken a restrictive, reluctant approach to this adjustment.225
age normal value with individual export transaction prices. This method can create or inflate
antidumping margins, and is arguably at odds with the express language of article 2.42 of the
Antidumping Agreement
222Authorities may calculate weighted average antidumping duties on a product-by-
product basis, instead of a product-line by product-line basis. For example, in the case of 13
inch and 21 inch televisions, average normal values would be calculated for each size of
television, not a single average for sales of both sizes of televisions. Color Picture Tubes
from Japan, 52 Fed. Reg. 44171, 44172 (1987). Negative margins on one type of television
may not offset dumping margins on the other type.
223 Antidumping Agreement, supra note 17, art. 2.2.1.1.
224See, e.g., 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(f)(1)(C)(ii) (1994).
225For example, the United States will not consider sales expenses, such as advertising
costs, to be start-up costs, 19 C.F.R. § 351.402(d)(4)(iii), despite the fact that the Anti-
dumping Agreement does not limit the adjustment for start-up costs to production costs.
Antidumping Agreement, supra note 17, art. 2.2.1.1. In fact, the Antidumping Agreement
instead speaks in terms of "costs associated with the production and sale of the product un-
der consideration." Id. (emphasis added). See also 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(f)(1)(A) (1994). The
U.S. law also limits this adjustment by requiring that the difference between the actual and
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If all the start-up requirements are met, the national authority normally
will substitute the unit fixed and variable production costs incurred at the
end of the start-up period for the unit costs incurred during the actual start-
up. In this way, the higher unit costs, low production, yield problems and
high depreciation normally characteristic of start-up operations are disre-
garded .2
8. Constructed Export Price ("CEP") Profit Deduction
When export price is "constructed, '227 the Antidumping Agreement
allows for the deduction, in addition to selling expenses, of an amount of
"total profit" allocable to the selling, distribution, and further manufacturing
costs incurred by the exporter's subsidiary in the importing country.228
This provision is one-sided because it does not permit a corresponding
adjustment for profit in the home market when home market sales are made
through an affiliate.229 Depending on the profit margin in a particular in-
dustry, this additional deduction from export price can create or worsen
dumping margins, and thus should be of concern to companies which sell
through subsidiaries in the export market. While some Members such as
the EU Member States applied this deduction even before the Antidumping
Agreement, its inclusion in the Antidumping Agreement means that it now
may be used by all WTO Members.230
Because of this change, exporters seeking to limit their antidumping li-
ability should, where possible, avoid sales in the importing country from an
affiliate's inventory, and instead should focus on direct export sales.
9. Below-Cost Sales
The Antidumping Agreement provides for the first time that sales in
the exporter's home market may be excluded when they are below full pro-
duction cost.231 Below-cost sales will only be excluded when they are
adjusted cost of production must be amortized over a "reasonable period of time subsequent
to the startup period...." 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(f)(1)(C); 19 C.F.R. § 351.407(d)(4)(ii). This
requirement is arguably inconsistent with the WTO Agreement, and has been criticized as
such by Canada in its comments on the U.S. proposed implementing regulations of May 15,
1996. See supra note 221.
226Antidumping Agreement, supra note 17, art. 2.2.1.1 n.6.
227 See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
228 Antidumping Agreement, supra note 17, art. 2.3.
229See also Koulen, supra note 172, at 366,369; Vermulst, supra note 141, at 425, 450.
23°See Council Regulation 384/96 of 22 December 1995 on Protecting Against Dumped Im-
ports from Countries not Members of the European Union, art. 2(9), 1996 O.J. (L 056) 1, 5. See
also Council Regulation 2423/88 of 11 July 1988 on Protection Against Dumped or Subsidized
Imports from Countries not Members of the European Economic Community, art 2, 1988 O.J.
(L 209) 1, 5.
231Antidumping Agreement, supra note 17, art. 2.2.1. Full production cost includes fixed
as well as variable expenses and selling, general and administrative expenses. Id. The Anti-
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made: (i) in "substantial quantities", (ii) "within an extended period of
time", and (iii) at prices that "do not permit the recovery of all costs within
a reasonable period of time".
232
Below-cost sales will be considered to be in "substantial quantities" if:
the volume of sales is not less than twenty percent of the total volume under
consideration, or the weighted average per unit price of all sales under con-
sideration is less than the weighted-average unit cost of production for all
sales.233 The requirement that below-cost sales occur "within" an extended
period of time means only that such sales must occur within one year,
which appears meaningless since any below-cost sale in the investigation
period would satisfy the standard.23 ' The third requirement, that prices
permit no cost recovery over a reasonable time, is satisfied when the price
that is below cost at the time of sale also is below the average production
cost for the entire investigation period.235
This provision can have three significant, disadvantageous effects on
the antidumping calculation for exporters. First, when below-cost home
market sales are excluded, the dumping comparison will be based on re-
maining above-cost sales.236 Depending on how the cost of production is
calculated, the home market sales which are above the "full" production
cost may be aberationally high and lead to significant dumping margins.
Second, the cost test may force a comparison with constructed value. When
all home market prices are below cost, the antidumping comparison will be
based on the constructed value, which is the fully loaded production cost,
plus any profit.237 This hypothetical calculation could create or enhance
dumping margins. Third, the cost test may result in an inflated profit
amount that will skew the margin calculation. When, for particular types of
the subject merchandise, there are no home market sales, the export price
also will be compared to the constructed value.238 In these instances, when
other types of subject products sold in the home market are above cost, the
dumping Agreement thus requires firms to sell above full, rather than marginal cost despite the
accepted business imperative to sell at marginal cost in certain circumstances.232Id. This language largely mirrored the preexisting U.S. language. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677b
(bXl) (1994).
233 Antidumping Agreement, supra note 17, art. 2.2.1 n.5.234Id. at n. 4.
235 id.
2361d. art. 2.2.1.
23 Id. art. 2.2.
238Id. In other words, constructed value (including profit) may be used for comparison,
rather than home market price, whenever either (i) all home market sales of subject products are
below cost (in which case profits normally will be based on some alternative methodology such
as the company's financial statement, although arguably there should be no profit in the calcula-
tion), or (ii) there simply are no sales in the home market of a particular type of subject mer-
chandise (in which case, profit on sales of other types of above-cost subject merchandise may be
used).
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profit amount will be based only on these above-cost sales, potentially re-
sulting in high margins.
The below-cost provision thus can increase the dumping margin in
several ways. Application of the cost test means that exporters can be
found guilty of dumping even when their export prices are higher than their
home market prices.
10. Affiliation
The question of whether parties are related is important to the anti-
dumping calculation in several respects. First, it determines who can sup-
port or oppose a dumping complaint as a member of the domestic
industry.23 It also determines whether export price sales are made through
a related party in the importing country.24' Finally, it determines whether
companies supplying parts and services to the exporters are related.241 Un-
der the broad definition in the Antidumping Agreement, companies may be
deemed to be "affiliated" through corporate groupings or close supplier re-
lationships.
Affiliation between parties can be based either on direct or indirect
control. 242 One party can control another either by legal relationship, i.e.,
through stock or equity ownership, or "operationally." 243 This latter provi-
sion has created significant uncertainty, and has left the door open to anti-
dumping complainants to assert that parties are related "operationally" even
where there is no direct stock relationship or control.244 A finding that two
parties are affiliated generally is unfavorable to the exporter, because it
means that sympathetic producers in the importing country can be denied
standing to oppose an antidumping complaint, and that the export price will
2'9 See id. art. 4.1(i) (defining "domestic industry" as excluding related parties); Id. at n. 11
(defining "related party").24 1d. art. 2.3. When resellers are related, export price may be constructed. See supra note
166 and accompanying text. When home market resellers are related, that price will be dis-
regarded in favor of the reseller's price to unaffiliated customers.
241 When suppliers are related, some national authorities base the value of the component
supplied on production cost if it is higher than the selling price. See, e.g., 19 U.S.C. §
1677b(f)(3) (1994).242 Antidumping Agreement, supra note 17, art. 2.3 n. 11. This provision provides that par-
ties will be related "if(a) one of them directly or indirectly controls the other, or (b) both of them
are directly or indirectly controlled by a third person; or (c) together they directly or indirectly
control a third person...."
243 1d.
244For example, in the United States, the U.S. Department of Commerce investigates
whether a supplier is related to a producer if it sells the majority of its production to such pro-
ducer, even if there is no legal relationship between the two parties. See, e.g., Certain Cold-
Rolled and Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Product, 62 Fed. Reg.18404, 18417 (1997).
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be "constructed" using adjustments that reduce the export price and thereby
increase the risk of dumping.245
11. Provisions Left Out of the Agreement
a. Anti-Circumvention
Anti-circumvention issues arise when an exporter subject to an anti-
dumping duty: (i) sends components of the subject product to the importing
country for assembly into a finished product that otherwise would be sub-
ject to the dumping duty, or (ii) sends the components to a non-subject third
country for assembly and then re-exportation to the importing country as a
product of the third country. The EU and the United States have imple-
mented regulations to cover such "screwdriver operations" within the scope
of a preexisting dumping duty.246  These anti-circumvention provisions
were controversial, particularly with regard to Asian exporters, their most
common target. The controversy was understandable as these provisions
called for the extension of duties to parts or countries that were never cov-
ered by the dumping investigation. Moreover, the application of duties to
products assembled in third countries raises questions of consistency with
customs origin rules. For example, in a U.S. case involving dumping duties
on certain Korean semiconductors, the United States applied the duty to
Korea-fabricated dies that were encapsulated in non-subject third countries
and exported to the United States, even though the U.S. Customs Service
origin rules deemed the imported semiconductors to be products of the third
countries, not products of Korea.247
This controversy carried over into the Uruguay Round negotiations.
The United States and the EU both sought to include in the WTO Anti-
dumping Agreement a provision permitting use of anti-circumvention pro-
visions. These provisions were strongly opposed by Asian countries and
developing countries, however, and at the end of the negotiations, the
United States opted to eliminate any reference to anti-circumvention, rather
245Antidumping Agreement, supra note 17, art. 4.1(i). See supra notes 207-10 and ac-
companying text for a discussion of who may oppose an antidumping complaint, and see supra
notes 158-59 and accompanying text for a discussion of the reduction to export price for sales
through subsidiaries in the importing country. Also, in countries such as the United States, sup-
plies provided by affiliated parties may be valued at production cost, when the production cost is
higher than the transfer price between the parties. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(f)(3) (1994).
246 Anti-circumvention legislation was first implemented in the late 1980s via the "screw-
driver" amendment to EU antidumping law. Under this provision, components will be subject to
the dumping order on the finished product if the value of the imported components is significant.
See Council Regulation 2423/88 of 11 July 1988 on Protection Against Dumped or Subsidized
Imports from Countries not Members of the European Economic Community, art 13, 1988 O.J.
(L 209) 1, 13. U.S. law contains a similar provision. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677j (1994).247 See Dynamic Random Access Memory Semiconductors of One Megabit and Above from
the Republic of Korea, 58 Fed. Reg. 15467, 15468 (1993), as amended by 58 Fed. Reg. 27520
(1993).
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than include a provision it deemed not sufficiently tough. Consequently,
the only reference to anti-circumvention in the WTO Agreement is a simple
ministerial decision stating that the negotiators were "unable to agree on
specific text" and that the issue would be referred to the Antidumping Prac-
tices Committee of the WTO for "resolution."
248
Despite the absence of any allowance for anti-circumvention measures
in the Antidumping Agreement, the United States and EU continue to im-
plement their anti-circumvention provisions.24 9 Continued application of
these anti-circumvention provisions almost certainly will result in a WTO
challenge on the grounds that the deliberate silence of the Antidumping
Agreement should be interpreted as a decision not to authorize such actions.
Further application of antidumping orders to third country products assem-
bled from subject parts could be contested as a violation of the WTO
Agreement on Rules of Origin.25 0 At the meeting of the Antidumping Prac-
tices Committee on April 29, 1997, in which the anti-circumvention issue
was raised, Japan complained against EC third country anti-circumvention
investigations.2 5  Korea filed a WTO challenge against a U.S. anti-
circumvention action concerning televisions assembled in Mexico and
Thailand from Korean components, which the United States later re-
scinded.2 52
b. Duty as a Cost
The WTO Antidumping Agreement does not provide explicitly for the
deduction from the constructed export price of any antidumping duties paid
upon importation. However, the Agreement contains a provision permitting
248 Statement on Anti-Circumvention, Dec. 15, 1993, Ministerial Decisions and Declarations
Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of GATT 1994.
249After implementation of the WTO antidumping legislation, the EU initiated two anti-
circumvention investigations concerning Asian suppliers of electronic weighing scales which are
assembled either in the EU or Indonesia. See Japan Protests To WTO Dumping Committee
About US. Action on NEC Supercomputers, Daily Executive (BNA), at A-4 (Apr. 30, 1997)
[hereinafter Japan Protests].
"°Agreement on Rules of Origin, Multilateral Agreements on Trade in Goods, supra note 1.
251 See Japan Protests, supra note 248.252The United States initiated several high profile anti-circumvention inquiries including one
concerning Korean televisions assembled in Thailand and Mexico. The Mexican government
complained that if the United States were to treat televisions assembled in Mexico from Korean
parts as Korean televisions subject to an antidumping order, despite the fact that under NAFTA
origin rules the televisions are of Mexican origin, the United States would be violating the
NAFTA. See Color Television Receivers from Korea, 61 Fed. Reg. 1339, 1343 (1996). The
Korean government requested WTO dispute resolution. See 62 Fed. Reg. 65843 (Dec. 16,
1997). The United States rescinded the case shortly thereafter. 62 Fed. Reg. 68255 (Dec. 31,
1997). It did not indicate whether the Mexican and Korean protests, or the questions regarding
WTO consistency, influenced the U.S. decision.
Trade Protection in the New Millennium
18:49 (1997)
adjustment to constructed export price for "duties and taxes," among other
expenses.
253
The EU in practice has deducted antidumping duties from the con-
structed export price prior to calculating the dumping margin.2 54 Arguably,
deducting antidumping duties from the constructed export price would un-
fairly double count the antidumping duties and inflate the dumping margin,
as an importer could not avoid dumping liability by raising its resale price
by the amount of the antidumping duty. The EU's continued use of this de-
duction could result in a WTO challenge. 5  When the U.S. Congress was
drafting Uruguay Round implementing legislation, there was great contro-
versy regarding this provision, which was supported by elements of the
U.S. domestic industry. Ultimately, it was stricken from the U.S. imple-
menting legislation. 56
E. Criticisms of Antidumping Enforcement and Calls for Reform
Despite the growing popularity of antidumping actions, the theoretical
underpinning for antidumping actions has been derided almost universally
by economists and scholars. Respected government bodies also have se-
verely criticized the enforcement of antidumping laws.
1. Widespread Criticism
The WTO Antidumping Agreement defines "dumping" as selling a
good in an export market at less than "normal value" - that is, at less than
the price in the exporter's home market or at below the cost of the good
plus profit. 57  Dumping is actionable when it causes or threatens material
253 Antidumping Agreement, supra note 17, art. 2.4.
P4prior to the issuance of regulations implementing the WTO Agreement, the European
Commission routinely deducted dumping duties from export price in refund and review pro-
ceedings. The Commission moderated the general rules slightly by adding a narrow exception in
the 1996 regulation, providing that dumping duties will not be deducted when there is "conclu-
sive evidence" that the duty is passed on in the resale price to the ultimate purchaser. Council
Regulation 384/96 of 22 December 1995 on Protecting Against Dumped Imports from Countries
not Members of the European Union, arts. 2(9) and 11(10), 1996 O.J. (L 056) 1, 5 and 15; see
also Van Bael & Jean-Frangois Bellis, AITI-DUMPING AD OTHER TRADE PROTECrION LAWS OF
THE EEC 81(2d ed. 1990).
255Under Article 2.4 of the Antidumping Agreement, supra note 17, the national authority
must provide for a fair comparison between export price and the normal value. Moreover, note 7
to Article 2.4 provides that national authorities should not "duplicate" adjustments.
256The Statement of Administrative Action accompanying the U.S. legislation implementing
the Antidumping Agreement provided that certain duty calculation provisions were "not in-
tended to provide for the treatment of antidumping duties as a cost." H. Doc. No. 103-316, Vol.
1, at 885 (1994)
257TAntidumping Agreement, supra note 17, art. 2.1. Normal value is the price of identi-
cal or similar goods in the home market. Such prices, however, must be above the cost of
production of the product. When there are insufficient above-cost prices in the home market,
normal value may be based either on prices from third countries, or on the cost of producing
the good, plus profit. Id. art. 2.2; see also supra notes 160-64 and accompanying text.
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injury to the domestic industry producing the good.258  In other words,
dumping normally occurs when there is injurious international price dis-
crimination. Antidumping theory holds that price discrimination is an in-
vidious practice whereby predatory exporters'attack markets by shipping at
unfairly low prices, driving local competitors out of business, and accumu-
lating monopoly or oligopoly power. Antidumping duties, under this the-
ory, are necessary to counteract predatory price discrimination by exporters.
Economists, academics and government organizations roundly criticize
this justification for antidumping duties, for a variety of reasons, discussed
below.
a. Price Discrimination Alone Not Objectionable
Many economists argue that price discrimination alone - selling at
different prices in different markets - is a natural and acceptable result of
free market forces because the structure and price elasticity of each market
drives the price in that market.25 9 Under this line of argument, there is no
justification for condemning certain export prices simply because they hap-
pen to be lower than prices in other markets.260 Domestic price discrimina-
tion - that is, differences in pricing between one country's domestic
regional markets - normally is not penalized.26' There arguably is no eco-
nomic reason for treating "international" price discrimination any more
harshly by imposing dumping duties.
258Antidumping Agreement, supra note 17, art. 3 n.9.259 See generally Jorge Miranda, Should Antidumping Laws Be Dumped? 28 LAW &
POL'Y INT'L BuS. 255 (1996). See also Deardoff, supra note 168, at 24-27.26°Dumping is only concerned when the export price is lower than the comparison price.
When the price discrepancy is in the opposite direction, i.e. when the export price is higher
than the domestic or comparison price, dumping law is not concerned. Deardorff, supra note
168, at 26. Indeed, in many antidumping cases, inevitable price fluctuations between mar-
kets naturally occurs in both directions. In such instances, exporters are penalized for
"negative" margins (when export price is below home market price), but are not given credit
for " positive" margins (when export price is higher than the home market price). See supra
notes 172-74 and accompanying text. See Bryan T. Johnson, A Guide to Antidumping Laws:
America's Unfair Trade Practice, Backgrounder (Heritage Found.) No. 906, July 21, 1992,
at 13 ("[I]t is a common business practice to sell products at a loss. For example, if a prod-
uct is not seeling [sic] well, a business owner might sell below cost in order to recoup at least
some of his investment in the product. Yet when a foreign firm sells below cost in the U.S.
market, it is considered to be abnormal and unfair.").
261 In the United States, there is a law, the Robinson-Patman Antidiscrimination Act
which prohibits domestic price discrimination,'but only if such pricing is anticompetitive and
predatory. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1994). This law, in any event, is very rarely enforced. The
United States enacted an antidumping law expressly linked to predatory intent - the Anti-
dumping Duty Act of 1916. 15 U.S.C. § 72 (1994). This law also has been used very rarely.
The infrequent use of these provisions is due to the difficulty of proving predatory intent or,
perhaps more simply, to the infrequency of predatory actions.
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b. Absence of Anticompetitive Effect
The primary economic complaint is that dumping is harmful only when
it involves anticompetitive or predatory intent to gain monopoly or oligop-
oly power in a foreign market, and that in practice this very rarely, if ever,
occurs. Studies by the U.S. Congressional Budget Office found that:
[N]early all economists would agree that [predatory pricing] is substan-
tially less common than price discrimination and selling below cost
and that, correspondingly, most price discrimination and selling below
cost do not constitute predatory pricing.
262
A study by the OECD found that antidumping law does not distinguish
between "legitimate" market strategies and anticompetitive monopolization,
and that less than ten percent of antidumping cases initiated even involved
"potential" monopolizing dumping.263  The OECD study concluded that
"efficiency-based criteria would condemn most, if not all, [antidumping]
export restraints. '264 The U.S. General Accounting Office made a similar
finding.265 Indeed, in today's trade environment, characterized by increas-
ing competition among a variety of export suppliers from different coun-
tries, predatory pricing practices arguably are futile because market
domination and monopolistic pricing are not attainable.266 Economists,
therefore, generally take the view that frequent use of antidumping action
cannot be justified as necessary to prevent predatory pricing.
267
To the extent that predatory pricing does occur, this reasoning contin-
ues, it can be counteracted through existing competition and antitrust laws
on the books in many WTO Member countries. This controversy has
262CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, How THE GATT AYFECTS U.S. ANTIDUMPING AND
COUNTERVAILING DUTY POLICY, app. A at 79 (Sept. 1994) [hereinafter CBO STUDY].
263INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INvESTMENT DmsION, ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC
COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, TRADE AND COMPETrTION: FRICrIoNs AFTER THE
URUGUAY ROUND, 8 (1996) [hereinafter OECD REPORT], citing ROBERT D. WILLIG,
ANTIDUMPING AND COMPETITION (1996).264id"
265 UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, INTERNATIONAL TRADE: COMPARIsON
OF U.S. AND FOREIGN ANTIDUMPING PRACTICES 8 (Nov. 1990) ("Economists generally view
dumping as harmful only when it involves 'predation,' that is, intent by the dumping party to
eliminate competition and gain monopoly power in a market. In practice, such predatory
dumping has rarely been documented.").26See Johnson, supra note 260, at 13 ("But the world market today is so integrated and
competitie [sic] that it is virtually impossible for a company to exploit a dominant share of a
market for long, if at all. Thanks to freer trade in recent decades, there is little chance of an
exporter achieving the power to charge a monopoly price.").
267 See generally Bernard M. Hoekman & Petros C. Wavroidis, Dumping, Antidumping and
Antitrust, J. WORLD TRADE, Feb. 1996, at 27. See also Michael Cartland, Antidumping and
Competition Policy, 28 LAw & POL'Y INT'LBus. 289 (1996).268 See CBO Study, supra note 262, at 5-22 (comparing antidumping law unfavorably to
U.S. antitrust law); see also OECD REPORT, supra note 263. Safeguard provisions, dis-
cussed supra, also are available to offset injurious price discrimination. See Deardorff, su-
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found its way into WTO negotiations. Member States traditionally critical
of overzealous use of antidumping laws have requested the WTO to analyze
the interaction between trade and competition law.
One contentious issue is whether antidumping laws are necessary,
given that competition laws address the issue of predatory pricing, and there
arguably is no other justification for antidumping laws. Another issue is
whether the antidumping laws themselves constitute an anticompetitive
practice. Advocates of tabling this contentious issue as a talking point for
negotiation include Japan and Korea.269 The United States has opposed all
efforts to bring trade remedy laws into the WTO discussions of interna-
tional competition policy.
270
c. Ineffective and Costly
Another common criticism of antidumping measures is that they do not
afford effective assistance to the domestic industry they are intended to
protect. A Congressional Budget Office study found that uncompetitive in-
dustries in the United States are more likely than others to receive protec-
tion, and are not likely to benefit from it in the long term.271 Further,
because of the expansion of international suppliers, a complainant's failure
to target all possible suppliers could mean that antidumping duties against
only some suppliers, even if significant, would merely divert the source of
exports to non-targeted countries, without an appreciable price effect in the
import market.
272
The antidumping protections often come at a substantial cost to con-
sumers. In a highly controversial study, the U.S. International Trade Com-
mission concluded that the cost to the U.S. economy of antidumping
measures was significantly higher than the benefit to the protected U.S. in-
dustry.273 Overbroad antidumping duties may curtail importation of prod-
ucts not even produced by domestic companies.274 The burden and damage
pra note 168, at 28. Antitrust laws may not reach exporters with no property in, or contacts
to, the importing country, however.269 WTO Members Poised For Fight Over AD CVD Law in Competition Group, INSIDE U.S.
TRADE, June 27, 1997, at 13.270Id. The United States presently is opposed to any WTO antitrust agreement. U.S. Op-
poses Plans to Negotiate Antitrust Agreement in WTO, Officials Say, Daily Executive (BNA), at
A-8 (Nov. 24, 1997).
271 See CBO Study, supra note 262, at 43.
272 See Deardorff, supra note 168, at 29.
2 73 See ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF ANTIDUMPING AND COUNTERVAILING DUTY ORDERS AND
SUSPENSION AGREEMENTS, USITC Pub. No. 2900, Inv. No. 332-344, at 4-13 (June 1995).
The study found that the cost of antidumping orders, with respect to their effect on consum-
ers and downstream industries, was at least $1.59 billion greater than any benefit conferred
on the protected U.S. industry. Id.
274In the United States, attempts by consumer industries to add a regulation providing for
a temporary removal of antidumping duties when there was no domestic production or do-
mestic production was in "short supply," were rejected due to opposition from domestic in-
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to consumer industries dependent on the imported product can be signifi-
275cant and can outweigh any benefits to the upstream complainant industry.
d. Substantive and Procedural Unfairness
Critics also complain that antidumping rules have been implemented
and applied by national authorities in an unfair manner, both procedurally
and substantively. For example, the OECD study concluded that anti-
dumping measures "can be abused for protectionist purposes. 27 6 Despite
the liberalizing changes agreed upon during the Uruguay Round negotia-
tions and adopted in the WTO Antidumping Agreement, the study found
that "antidumping procedures can still serve as a protectionist tool." 277 The
CBO study lodged similar complaints against the administration of U.S.
law, which it characterized as "slanted against foreign persons," and in-
creasingly protectionist and biased.278 The U.S. General Accounting Office
surveyed pre-Uruguay Round administration of antidumping measures by
Australia, United States, Canada, EU and Mexico, and found that the EU,
along with the United States and Mexico, had been accused of having low
evidentiary thresholds for initiating antidumping actions.279  This study
found that the EU and Mexico had the least transparent systems for admin-
istering the antidumping laws, and that the transparency and scope of Judi-
cial review in the United States was broader than in the other countries."'
dustries that make frequent use of the antidumping law, such as steel. Short Supply Comes
Up Short, AM. METAL MARKET, May 7, 1997, at 1.
275See Dumping Wars, J. COM., Apr. 28, 1997, at 6A (discussing U.S. antidumping du-
ties on 4 and 6 inch televisions, which are not made by the U.S. industry, and the decision of
a U.S. computer maker to move offshore when an antidumping duty barred imports of dis-
plays not produced by the domestic industry).276 See OECD Study, supra note 263, at 7. This study noted the use of "asymmetrical or
unfair price comparisons" and use of "arbitrary exchange rates". Both would have the effect
of inflating antidumping margins.277 Id. Indeed, many have observed that antidumping laws are becoming increasingly
protectionist. See generally Francis G. Jacobs, Observations on the Antidumping Law and
Practice of the European Community, and some Possible Reforms, in ANTiDUMPING LAW
AND PRACTiCE, supra note 141, at 354-57. The pre-WTO practice of the parties to the Anti-
dumping Code has led increasingly, in all jurisdictions considered, to an inflation of dump-
ing margins by the cumulative effect of increasingly strict interpretations of the various
components of the dumping calculations. Id.278CBO Study, supra note 262, at 41-50; see also Johnson, supra note 268, at I ("The
antidumping laws are confusing and arbitrary, and in many instances merely allow American
firms to secure punitive tariffs against competing importers where no unfair trade practices
are involved."). The study expressed particular concern for subjective price comparisons
and asymmetric adjustments. Id.279The Antidumping Agreement, however, set forth more detailed requirements for ini-
tiation of an antidumping action. See supra note 141. Although national authorities still
have substantial discretion in determining when to initiate an antidumping investigation, the
tighter standard under the WTO Antidumping Agreement should reduce the number of com-
plaints on this issue.280CBO STUDY, supra note 262, at 41-50.
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2. Controversy
These criticisms of antidumping measures inevitably collide with the
widespread and growing political support for antidumping measures. Two
of the studies referenced above serve as interesting illustrations. First, the
OECD Report, which took five years to complete and reflected the views of
eminent economists, former government officials and scholars, was released
to OECD member countries in confidential draft form in late 1995. The EU
and the United States, both substantial users of antidumping measures, at-
tacked the portions of the Report that were critical of antidumping measures
and demanded revisions. 281 Before the Report was released in 1996, they
reportedly were successful.
282
Second, the U.S. International Trade Commission report on the cost of
U.S. antidumping measures originally was requested by Bush Administra-
tion United States Trade Representative ("USTR") Carla Hills in 1992. Be-
fore the study was commenced, however, amid severe political criticism,
Clinton Administration USTR Mickey Kantor broadened the parameters of
the study in 1993 to include the benefit of antidumping measures to the do-
mestic industry.283 When the Report was completed in 1995, it created a
firestorm within the International Trade Commission which had difficulty
even agreeing to release the Report, and was met by protest from both do-
mestic industry and free trade advocates.284
The controversy surrounding antidumping measures is certain to grow.
On the one hand, antidumping measures have strong political support in
Member countries as the most effective import protection for struggling
domestic industries. On the other hand, there is established opposition to
antidumping measures, which is gaining gradual support from exporting
interests concerned about global proliferation of antidumping measures.
281See Guy de Jonquieres, Report Counts Cost of Antidumping, FIN. TIMES (London),
Sept. 21, 1995, at 5 (The U.S. and EU "have vigorously attacked its findings in the OECD,
and are intent on watering the report down before allowing it to be published later this
year"); Guy de Jonquieres, US and EU Attack Anti-dumping Report, FIN. TIMEs (London),
Sept. 21, 1995, at5.
282 See Jonquieres, US and EU Attack Anti-dumping Report, supra note 281 (stating that
"[t]he draft report, submitted to the OECD in March, is understood already to have been
amended under U.S. and EU pressure.").
283 See Kantor Approves Antidumping Study, FAcTs ON FILE, WORLD NEws DIGEST, July
8, 1993, at 506 F1.2"For an interesting discussion of the in-fighting at the ITC caused by the Report, see
Cracking Up, NAT'L J., Oct. 28, 1995, at 2636 and Nancy Dunne, US. Antidumping Study
Raises Political Hackles: Report questioning countervailing duties becomes focus of ITC
dissension, FIN. PosT, Aug. 23, 1995, at 10. While former International Trade Commis-
sioner Alfred Eckes, a proponent of import protections, criticized the Report as being the re-
sult of "cooking the books at the ITC," Carla Hills stated that it was a narrow study that did
not reflect the pervasive effects of antidumping measures. Dunne infra; Alfred E. Eckes,
Cooking the Books at the ITC, J. COM., July 14, 1995, at 6A;
Trade Protection in the New Millennium
18:49 (1997)
This controversy, and the expected increase in antidumping actions, will
lead to calls for reform of the antidumping regime in the future.
2 s8
There are other, more engaging justifications for the antidumping re-
gime, beyond the political self-interest in protecting domestic industries. In
particular, antidumping measures may serve as a necessary trade-off to
achieve further liberalization in reducing global tariffs and duties. Many
countries may have been willing and able to agree to the dramatic liberali-
zations that have rolled back import tariffs over the past twenty years only
if they were allowed discretionary use of antidumping measures as a fall-
back. 6 Further, the antidumping regime constitutes a quasi-judicial "inter-
face" that may enable countries with very different economic systems to
warily open their markets to one another under a common, enforceable
regulatory framework.
28 7
Notwithstanding the growing concerns regarding the proliferation of
antidumping measures, the vigorous and entrenched political support for
these measures, as illustrated by the recent reaction to the OECD and ITC
Reports, will ensure that antidumping measures are with us for the foresee-
able future.
IV. A FACT OF LIFE FOR FUTURE EXPORTERS - COMPLIANCE MEASURES
Industries in developed countries in many sectors have demonstrated a
readiness to employ antidumping laws as a weapon to protect them from
their competitors abroad. Developing countries are getting into the dump-
ing game with remarkable speed. This trend will continue. An antidump-
ing case can result in the imposition of prohibitive company-specific import
duties, placing an exporting company at a competitive disadvantage (rela-
tive to domestic companies, as well as exporters from non-targeted coun-
tries, or even exporters from the same country receiving more favorable
duty rates). If the dumping duties are high enough, exporters can be ex-
cluded from the market entirely. Moreover, each percentage point of an
antidumping margin can represent a significant annual cost to the company,
2SSIn the European Union, this conflict is manifested between the southern countries
which tend to favor antidumping action, and the northern countries which generally do not.
Conflict is most acute with regard to the European Commission's consideration of the
"community interest" before initiating an antidumping action. This procedure was added as
a reform to require analysis of the effect of duties on user industries. See Dumping Folly,
FIN. TIMES, Apr. 1, 1997, at 21. In North America, Canada and Mexico have sought to con-
vince the United States to drop or reform its antidumping measures within the North Amer-
ica Free Trade Agreement - so far without success. See Mexico, Canada to Seek Halt to
U.S. Antidumping Action, Daily Executive (BNA), at A-4 (Dec. 24, 1996). The Heritage
Foundation report sets forth a bold, if unrealistic proposal for the phase-out of antidumping
laws. See generally Johnson, supra note 268.286 See generally JAGDISH BHAGWATI, PROTECTIONISM 485-530 (1988).
287 See Vermulst, supra note 141, at 460 (citing JOHN. H. JACKSON & WILLIAM DAVEY,
LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 650-1 (2d ed. 1986)).
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so that even a partial improvement in a company's dumping liability could
save the company substantial revenues. For example, if a company with
annual exports of $50 million to a particular country acted to reduce its
dumping margins on sales to that country by only four percentage points,
from say, seven to three percent, it would save $2 million annually.
It is therefore essential for an exporting company, whether from a de-
288veloped or a developing country, to consider the implementation of an
antidumping compliance program, in order to assess antidumping risks, and
take measures to avoid or diminish them.28 9 The same holds true for com-
panies dependant on imported inputs or finished goods. Creation of such a
program entails four basic steps, discussed below.
A. Development of Working Knowledge of Antidumping Rules
Because of the complexity of the antidumping rules and the various
options for establishing a compliance program, it is essential for key deci-
sion-makers in the exporting company to become generally familiar with
the WTO antidumping rules as implemented in their main export markets,
so that they can make informed tactical decisions regarding compliance.
Other management and support personnel should be given the task of be-
coming more closely informed about the rules. They should keep in mind
that the antidumping rules, which were written by lawyers and politicians
and are enforced by bureaucrats of the importing countries, may not reflect
"real world" business practices or commonly held economic principles.290
If the exporting company has a significant share of its own domestic mar-
ket, it also may find it prudent to have a working knowledge of its home
country's dumping rules, to assess whether to employ them against foreign
competitors.
2 8 BusiNEss GUIDE TO THE URUGUAY ROUND, supra note 8, at 199 ("Enterprises in many
developing countries are finding that as their exports of manufactured products rise, there are
increasing pressures from industries in the importing countries for the levy of such duties, on
the grounds that the goods are being dumped...").289_Id. ("For business persons, knowledge of the complex rules on the levy of anti-
dumping ... duties is essential in their capacities as exporters and producers.... An under-
standing of the rules could, for instance, enable an exporting enterprise to take precautionary
steps to avoid anti-dumping actions in foreign markets where there are increasing pressures
from industrial and other groups for such actions.").
29°Antidumping calculations entail many accounting methodologies which often ignore
the way most businesses normally keep their books. The antidumping rules require respon-
dents to report a per-product "fully loaded" cost, as discussed supra note 168 and accompa-
nying text, although many businesses do not require or record costs on a product-specific
basis, or do so at a variable cost level only. See Antidumping Agreement, supra note 17, art.
2.4. Similarly, the antidumping rules define the date of sale as the contract date, although
businesses generally record sales by invoice date. See id. at n.8.
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B. Assessment of the Exporting Company's Operations and Activities
1. Degree of Exposure
An analysis of an exporting company's antidumping liability should
begin with a review of the company's products and markets (bearing in
mind that the antidumping law applies only to sales of goods not services).
An important threshold question is the significance the company attaches to
each of its export markets, both presently and in the future, as the answer
affects the resources the company may wish to devote to antidumping com-
pliance in a particular market. While antidumping rules and procedures
vary among WTO Member countries, the basic principles are the same;
hence, an antidumping compliance program structured for one export mar-
ket can readily be adapted for other export markets as well.
Because an antidumping complaint in a given market is dependent
upon a showing of injury to the domestic industry in that market,291 other
important considerations in assessing possible antidumping liability are the
price sensitivity of the products shipped by the exporter, as well as the re-
cent performance of competing industries based in the importing country.
Where the competing domestic industry has experienced difficulties in the
recent past (e.g., diminished profits, decreasing market share or lay-offs) in
a price sensitive market sector, the risks of a possible dumping action are
greatly enhanced. The exporting company must realize that these circum-
stances increase its vulnerability to antidumping action, even if the com-
pany believes that the reason for these difficulties has nothing to do with its
own exports (i.e., they are the result of a down cycle in the market, compe-
tition from other suppliers, or poor management). Conversely, when there
is no apparent domestic industry producing a particular product in the im-
porting country, the antidumping risks will be negligible.
Companies already subject to a dumping duty also should consider a
compliance program. Implementation of an effective price guideline could
enable the exporter or importer to lower the applicable duty amount, which
in many Member States would allow the exporter to request a refund of du-
ties deposited, and may improve its position in a future sunset proceed-
ing.
293
291See id. art. 3.1.292 See BusrNEss GUIDE TO THE URUGUAY ROUND supra note 8, at 199 ("while it may
continue to charge export prices that are lower than its domestic prices in markets where it
faces no threat, it should avoid doing so in markets where anti-dumping actions are possi-
ble.").
293 See supra notes 172 and 253 for a discussion of refund and review proceedings, and
notes 211-19 for a discussion of sunset proceedings. The need for a compliance program is
particularly strong in U.S. dumping cases, when the amount of duties owed is determined
retroactively, after a dumping order is imposed and deposits are paid. Id.
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2. Corporate Structure
In deciding upon a suitable compliance program, the company should
consider its capacity to implement compliance measures, as well as the
amount of resources the company wishes to devote to the task. In addition
to the dumping risks discussed supra, this decision must be based on the
size and resources of the company, and the types, quantity and value of
products exported which must be monitored.
Generally, in managing antidumping liability, an exporting company
must utilize sales personnel (to enforce price guidelines and review sales
and selling expense information), accounting personnel from the corporate,
divisional and factory levels (to collect and derive the necessary cost, ex-
pense and sales information), and computer personnel (to arrange and
maintain necessary data, and to run the dumping margin analysis). A com-
pany will need to decide the extent to which it can devote personnel from
each of these departments to antidumping compliance.
C. Determining a Suitable Compliance Program for the Company
At the most general level, the question of compliance may appear
rather simple - to avoid antidumping liability the company's export price
should be above the home market price, as well as the fully-loaded cost. A
closer look, however, reveals that this may not be sufficient, and that there
are many considerations and options in determining an appropriate pro-
gram, which can vary in terms of detail, focus and coverage.
At the outset, the company must realize that regardless of the program
it chooses, it is often very difficult to implement a program that will guar-
antee that it will never be found to be dumping; this is due to the complex-
ity of the antidumping rules described above, the administrative discretion
afforded to national authorities in calculating antidumping margins, and the
difficulty of employing a comprehensive and precise price monitoring dis-
cipline in a dynamic and rapidly fluctuating marketplace. Nevertheless, a
company can take measures to substantially lower the risk of an affirmative
antidumping finding by implementing an antidumping compliance program.
In deciding upon an appropriate program, the company must balance the
risk of antidumping liability against the burden imposed by a compliance
program. The burden includes not only the resources devoted to compli-
ance efforts, but also the pricing restraints that a program would impose
upon a company. The two major factors the company will need to consider
in deciding upon a program are the program's prospective or retroactive fo-
cus, and its degree of detail.
1. Prospective and/or Retroactive Program
A company wishing to avoid dumping liability must ensure that future
sales are appropriately priced. This generally will require the exporting
company to prospectively set minimum export prices or price ranges, based
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on estimated costs and sales expenses. Companies also will have to estab-
lish minimum and maximum home market (and or third country) price lev-
els for the same period of time, to ensure they are above cost, but below
U.S. price levels. These price levels will have to be adjusted periodically,
monthly or quarterly, as the company deems appropriate, using a forward
exchange rate. To add to the complexity, the price guidelines should be
determined on an ex-factory basis, using estimates for applicable movement
and selling expenses in both the export and domestic markets.2 94
The establishment of acceptable price levels is of extraordinary im-
portance and sensitivity, involving sales, cost and marketing estimates. The
price guidelines must be accurate to ensure antidumping compliance on the
one hand, but must also be flexible to ensure competitive and realistic pric-
ing on the other. A company's selling division also should take these levels
into consideration when developing new marketing programs which will af-
fect ex-factory pricing (e.g., rebates, promotions).
In addition to price guidelines, the company can adopt other strategic
measures to limit liability. It may simplify and reduce the type of selling
programs/expenses in its focus markets to make monitoring more effective
and simple. The company also can ship directly to unrelated customers in
its key export markets and its domestic market, rather than through affili-
ates, to simplify the price adjustments that will need to be estimated. It can
adjust its information management system to track expenses, costs, returns
and credits on a per-product and per-sale basis which simplifies collection
and monitoring. Further, it can adopt a cost accounting system that allows
for the simple collection of actual per-unit costs.
A company also may wish to include in the program a retroactive
analysis of sales in a prior period as would be done in an actual antidump-
ing case. While a retroactive analysis does not protect against future anti-
dumping liability, it is an important complement to a prospective price
guideline system because it can provide a more accurate analysis of anti-
dumping liability, based on actual prices and expenses recorded in a prior
period (rather than estimates), and can serve to "test" the sufficiency of the
system for setting price levels. The retroactive approach requires the col-
lection of product specific price, sales and cost information, to be used in a
detailed dumping margin simulation. Because a simultaneous prospective
and retroactive monitoring system will be burdensome, the company may
wish to conduct a retroactive analysis only intermittently, depending on the
degree of risk it perceives and the importance of the export market.
294See supra notes 170-71 and accompanying text for a discussion of the dumping calcula-
tions, which are performed on the basis of ex-factory prices. The price guidelines thus require
that the net export price be above the above-cost net home market price for the same or similar
merchandise.
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2. Degree of Detail
The company also will need to decide how much precision it desires in
collecting and adjusting sales price and cost information. The accuracy of
the program obviously corresponds to the detail of the record-keeping.
However, it is not realistic for most companies to collect data with the pre-
cision that would be required in an actual dumping case 95 because the
complexity of the data and the need to depart from normal business practice
would impose too great a burden. A company therefore must find some
balance between a realistic, administrable data collection system, and one
that provides an acceptable degree of accuracy.
Some examples may illustrate the point: (i) While the antidumping
rules generally require actual product-specific cost data,296 most companies
utilizing a process cost accounting system do not maintain data in that man-
ner; it may be more pragmatic for companies to implement a system that
utilizes the company's standard costs or budget figures, adjusted by the ap-
propriate variance, to establish an "approximate" product cost. (ii) Simi-
larly, although antidumping rules generally require the recording of direct
selling expenses on a sale and customer-specific basis, businesses generally
do not; it therefore may be more practical for the company to implement a
system whereby it calculates expenses on a more generalized aggregated
basis. (iii) If the company has significant sales in its home market, it may
wish to exclude third-country sales from the scope of its program as unnec-
essary.
297
D. Implementation of the Compliance Program
Once the company decides upon an appropriate compliance program, it
must take measures to ensure the program will be adequately and effec-
tively implemented. This normally will entail the formation of an anti-
dumping team from the selling, accounting and computer departments, as
appropriate. The team will need to be trained to conduct the data collection
analysis tasks required by the program in the most effective and least bur-
densome manner. These tasks would include the periodic establishment of
minimum and maximum price levels based on projected expenses and costs,
and the dissemination of this information to appropriate sales personnel on
a timely basis. The tasks also may include the collection of actual prior
.95For instance, in an actual case a respondent normally would be required to collect prices
for all sales in the investigation period, net of movement and selling adjustments on a per trans-
action and per unit basis. It must also collect fully loaded unit costs for each product sold. See
supra notes 170-92 and accompanying text for a discussion of the antidumping calculation.296 See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
297 See supra notes 160-64 and accompanying text, discussing when the home market sales
will be used. If the company has negligible home market sales, however, third-country prices
can serve as a comparison for dumping purposes. Using export prices to one market as a com-
parison base for another export market often enables exporters to avoid antidumping liability.
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data for a retroactive dumping margin analysis, and the production of a re-
port on the results of such analysis, with recommendations for changes or
modifications to the compliance program as necessary.
It is usually essential to involve top management of the company in the
initial implementation phase, given the importance of the compliance
measures (e.g., setting minimum price levels). Further, the program may
impose new responsibilities or burdens on personnel throughout the com-
pany, who may benefit from a clear message from management on the im-
portance and priority of the program.
As with other compliance programs, the antidumping system must
provide for periodic education and training to keep personnel abreast of im-
portant changes in antidumping rules and procedures (e.g., recent changes
regarding the Uruguay Round antidumping rules). This takes on added sig-
nificance as company personnel are transferred to other departments over
time because the company's "institutional memory" on antidumping com-
pliance will be essential if a dumping complaint is filed or a review is con-
ducted. The system also should provide for periodic audits to ensure the
company's objectives are being adequately carried out. In this respect, the
company may wish to consult with outside antidumping experts, at least in
the beginning phases of the implementation program.
The establishment and implementation of an antidumping compliance
program is a major commitment, and does not necessarily guarantee that a
case will never be brought against a company, or that it will never be sub-
ject to a dumping margin. Nevertheless, a company that has taken appro-
priate steps to minimize its antidumping liability can substantially improve
its ability to survive an antidumping case with its important export market
position intact. This fact can prove crucial not only regarding the com-
pany's competitive position relative to rival companies in the importing
country, but also relative to other exporters whose competitive position may
depend upon the results of the case. Any company that is a significant ex-
porter of goods, therefore, should review the steps outlined above to deter-
mine if some type of antidumping compliance program is in its interest.
V. CONCLUSION
The WTO Agreement ensures that antidumping actions will proliferate.
On the one hand, it calls for a significant reduction in tariffs and proscribes
or limits other import protections, thereby exposing industries throughout
the world to international competition as never before. On the other hand, it
requires signatories to ratify legislation consistent with the Antidumping
Agreement, resulting in an exponential increase in the number of countries
possessing the dumping weapon, the most potent remaining tool for import
protection. The result, an increase in antidumping actions, is manifest. As
more countries target one another, there will be a consequent drag on inter-
national trade, particularly in sensitive sectors such as steel, chemicals, tex-
tiles and electronics.
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The increase in antidumping actions undoubtedly will give rise to calls
for reform from multinational corporations that are the frequent targets of
antidumping actions, as well as end user industries dependent upon interna-
tional suppliers, economists and consumer groups. These critics, and their
government supporters, will call for further disciplines on initiation of anti-
dumping actions, and the roll-back of the current trend in litigation, forcing
the issue onto the agenda of future rounds of multinational trade negotia-
tions, possibly in connection with competition policy. 298 The proponents of
the antidumping laws will fiercely resist any perceived weakening of the
Antidumping Agreement, however. The antidumping laws have served as a
"safety valve," arguably assisting in trade liberalization in the sense that
they allow Members a political fall-back, enabling them to agree to further
tariff reductions. The domestic industries traditionally supporting strong
antidumping laws throughout the world tend to be politically powerful and
economically significant, thus assuring a constituency for strong anti-
dumping protections in future multinational negotiations.
Regardless of how the antidumping issue is raised and addressed in
future rounds of multinational negotiations, it is clear that it will be with us
for the foreseeable future, posing a risk and challenge to exporting indus-
tries. In the era of the ascendancy of antidumping laws, exporting compa-
nies must familiarize themselves with the WTO Antidumping Agreement
and applicable national antidumping laws, so that they may assess their
vulnerability to antidumping action and decide upon a strategy to survive
and prosper.
298WTO Members will seek to initiate a new "Millenium Round" of multinational trade
negotiations in 2000. See Chances Good for New Round of WTO Talks in Millenium, Brittan
Says, Daily Executive (BNA), at A-19 (Nov. 24, 1997); WTO Members to Set Out Approach
to New Negotiations Next Year, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Dec. 26, 1997, at 14, 15 (negotiations
"have not begun to tackle the more controversial issues, such as antidumping as it relates to
competition policy."). See supra notes 262-70 for a further discussion of antidumping and
competition law.
